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Abstract
Moore et al., from the C ooperative Association for I nternet Data Analysis (CAIDA),
proposed in recent years another measurement and monitoring method for the network
and Internet. Network Telescopes are used to detect malicious traffic events generated
from Denial of Service attacks, worm infected hosts and misconfiguration. This report
is focused on endemic and pandemic incidents (DoS, Worm) and how these incidents
observed through different Darknet topologies and statistical models. Furthermore,
network telescopes effectiveness will be examined for broader understanding and eval-
uation.
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Preface
For the purpose of this report network telescopes will be examined and how these sys-
tems will analyze, characterize and categorize pandemic and endemic incidents. There
will be no further analysis on pandemic and endemic incidents, from the point of view
on how they work, how generate attacks or even the underlying mechanisms of these
potential threats. Moreover, various researchers opinions will be analyzed and how re-
searchers observed and monitored these attacks and only from this point of view. Ad-
ditionally, this report will evaluate topologies and architectures of network telescopes.
Furthermore, at the end of this report, the reader will examine the effectiveness of
network telescopes.
This report is conducted into six different chapters with different topics and continu-
ity. The first chapter is a general introduction for the topics covered in the report.
Also, there will be an extended analysis of what is a network telescope. Furthermore,
familiarization with few of the topics will be presented to the reader. On Chapter two
the concept of IP ranges and CIDR will be covered. There will be notation of pre-
fixes for convenience. Furthermore, Ch2 will examine the need for large fractions of IP
addresses which a network telescope must possess to operate correctly. Moreover, the
concepts of targets and events will be presented. At the end of Ch2, the reader will be
able to examine the single packet algorithms and how network telescopes characterize
the times and duration attacks.
The third chapter, examines the pandemic and endemic incidents observed by a net-
work telescope. As it was mentioned before, these phenomena will not be analyzed by
itself, but from the point of view of the researchers. Furthermore, the reader will un-
derstand backscatter analysis and the propagation monitoring tools network telescopes
make use of. Ch4 examines different topologies of network telescopes. There will be an
analysis on passive, active, distributed, anycast, transit, honeyframs or hybrid systems
and greynets which are mixtures of dark IPs and active ones. Ch5 is the evaluation
and analysis of network telescopes. This chapter must be considered carefully because
of the contents. Actually, this chapter refers to the advantages and disadvantages of
network telescopes as systems. If it is read carefully, the reader can understand that
this chapter is not only examines the deficiencies of telescopes, but also examines the
concerns of the researchers and how these problems can be solved. The last chapter
examines the observations resulted from the present research and proposals for prob-
lematic characteristics of network telescopes.
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In conclusion, it must be referred that if the reader needs further information while
examines this reports, before the bibliography section, can find glossary and abbrevi-
ations. Glossary and abbreviations are combined together, in order the reader to have
the opportunity to comprehend and review the various ideas. Furthermore, it must be
mentioned that in certain chapters the concepts are not fully developed. This is because
of the lack of resources found from academia and educational networks. Unfortunately,
network telescopes are new concepts and are not fully developed, concluding from the
research done so far. Additionally, the bibliography at the end will help the reader to
extend his/her knowledge on this particular subject with further information.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Why we analyze Network Telescopes
Network telescopes ,in recent years, have emerged as a solution for monitoring miscon-
figuration, pandemic and endemic incidents. Its usefulness extends to academia, en-
terprises,organizations and businesses for experimental reasons, until recently. CAIDA
organization with the help of institutions, organizations and enterprises created a dis-
tributed network telescope the IMS(Internet Monitor Sensor). Its ability and effec-
tiveness observed with the extended monitoring of pandemic and endemic incidents.
Pandemic and endemic incidents are DoS and Internet Worms respectively.
Network telescopes have many features which create efficient systems. Moreover, the
architecture of network telescopes and how this traffic is monitored and characterized
is very interesting. Specialized algorithms, health community mathematics, sensors,
Virtual Machines and more features describing an innovative system. Moreover, topo-
logical models are completely different and designed to offer efficiency in a network.
Furthermore, network telescopes instead of monitoring assigned addresses such as In-
trusion Detection/Prevention Systems, telescopes monitor unused resources. The use
of dark(unused) addresses help a network telescope to monitor efficiently, because traf-
fic in unused addresses means misconfiguration, unsolicited traffic or propagation of
malware.
In conclusion, there will be an extended analysis of network telescopes through the
chapters that help the reader comprehend and understand various features and charac-
teristics of network telescopes. In case that the reader wants to extend his/her research,
at the bibliography section can find an extended research of technical reports, in pro-
ceedings, proceedings, in books and many more references. For further research it is
recommended for the reader to search keywords such as “network telescopes”.
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1.2 What is a Network Telescope
At the end of previous millennium, beginning of the new era, Moore et al. proposed
Network Telescopes as an alternative to network/security monitoring and measurement
systems. Network Telescopes ,today, can be used mostly for academic purposes and
gathering data as distributed topologies for Internet observance; analysis of this subject
is not of our concern at the moment. Our foremost priority is to explain what a network
telescope is.
Figure 1.1: Network Telescope[56]
A Network Telescope considered to be a portion of routed IP addresses, with no or
little legitimate traffic exists. Monitors remote security events which are the results
of flooding DoS attacks, misconfiguration, type of scanning and worm propagation
[64]. Therefore ,the observed traffic in an unused address space must be the result of
misconfiguration, worms scanning or backscatter traffic from spoofed addresses since
there are no hosts or devices[52].
Otherwise, a telescope can be considered as a tool or Darknet/BlackHole/Internet
Sink/Telescope [2] which observes specific remote security events such as DoS/DDoS at-
tacks, worm scanning from infected hosts, port/host scanning and misconfiguration[59].
Furthermore, if a host sends packets to randomly selected IP addresses there would be
a probability to observe these packets , if the address space monitored is enough for
safe conclusions resulting from statistical methodologies and the amount of incidents
observed [56]. Therefore, analyzing and disassociating the unwanted traffic could be
manageable[2]. Additionally, the prefix of the subnetwork observed characterizes the
Network Telescope and determines the amount of data collected. The majority of Net-
work Telescopes passively monitor the traffic, but there are also advanced telescopes
that could perform active monitoring[31]. On the other hand, a telescope could be
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used to monitor a section of Internet space and measure the traffic of a wide range of
IP addresses for backscatter activity, worm scanning and host scanning[69].
For further understanding, analyzing figure 1.1 could be beneficial. The infected host,
in our figure, sends packets to all the hosts and IP addresses in our network, even to
addresses that no traffic exists. Therefore, the network telescope receives the packets
sent and by measurement techniques can analyze the purpose of this activity.
1.3 Endemic and Pandemic Incidents
Endemic and Pandemic incidents are the (Distributed)Denial-of-Service and Internet
Worms, respectively. In DoS attacks the attacker spoofs IP addresses randomly and
floods the targets with requests. The target responds believing that the sender is a
legitimate user[59]. On the other hand, worm is a self-replicating/propagating program
which exploits vulnerabilities without human intervention in order to infect hosts.
Hence, the infectees will continue the propagation and the spread of the worm[56].
These incidents are fully described with the monitoring capabilities of a network tele-
scope. The characterization and categorization of these incidents will be analyzed basis
to the efficient mathematical tools and algorithms operating at the network telescope.
Furthermore, at Ch 3 will be analyzed the different cases of worm attacks and how
pandemic/endemic incidents observed from Internet Monitor Sensor or other telescope
implementations. CodeRed, for instance, was analyzed and observed throughout its
propagation life cycle. Additionally, in the case of endemic incidents it was observed
that most of the attacks were from competitors or for personal reasons.
1.4 Measurement Tools
Network telescopes use complex mathematical algorithms and tools. Usually, use sta-
tistical methodologies for measuring the start/end and duration times of the attacks.
Moore et al. in their report for network telescopes fully analyzed the models of pre-
cision times and rates for event characterization. In the case of backscatter traffic ,
for instance, use the backscatter hypothesis to characterize and categorize the packets
observed.
On the other hand, computer scientists borrow the epidemic models of the health
community in order to characterize and categorize pandemic incidents. Through the
SI and AAWP epidemic models network telescopes analyze and characterize the traffic
flow observed from various incidents. Furthermore, through the algorithmic models
used network telescopes can categorize the general traffic observed.
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1.5 Detection, Deception and Prevention Topolo-
gies
The topologies of network telescopes, could be categorized into two. A passive network
telescope records the observed packets and takes no further actions. By this interac-
tion, network telescope has the opportunity to observe hosts and packet information.
However, information about attack or misconfiguration might not be revealed. For
instance, if a network telescope observe the TCP handshake will not monitor it. It will
monitor it as attempt for connection with TCP[52].
On the other hand, an active telescope responds to incoming packets and tries to
establish communication with the attacker. In the case of an Internet worm a network
telescope will continuously communicate with more than 10 messages, sometimes, until
the worm is identified. Active monitoring system can reliably distinguish attacks,
emulate a service and analyze attacks. Furthermore, it can keep tracks of the attacker
and offer scalability[34].
1.6 Evaluation, Analysis and Quality of Security
The evaluation, analysis and quality of security on network telescopes is an extensive
matter that must be covered. Unfortunately, even if network telescopes have extensive
use of mathematics, its implementations are difficult. There are many problems that
must be solved, especially with sensors’ topologies and how these sensors can monitor
efficiently. Furthermore, it was observed that honeyfarms have extended features which
must be implemented with extreme care.
Moreover, it was observed that network telescopes are effective in seeing large explo-
sions of events and its effectiveness depends on proper statistical and mathematical
tools[56]. On the other hand, Bailey et al., observed that small darknets ,sometimes,
can receive more packets/day than monitors which observe large IP ranges[52]. Moore
et al., added that a telescope’s size is proportional to the size of the space monitored.
Therefore, short and low intensity attacks generate less packets and thus the need for
large monitoring space is required to resolve activity’s information[61].
1.7 Outline of the following Chapters
Chapter 2 focus on the IP ranges and the need of telescopes to monitor large fractions
of addresses. Furthermore, mathematical tools and how network telescopes use these
algorithms for efficient traffic characterization will be examined. Moreover, on chap-
ter 3 there will be an analysis of pandemic and endemic incidents, and how network
telescopes observe and categorize these phenomena. Additionally, on chapter 3 mathe-
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matical tools, for instance backscatter analysis and worm propagation models, will be
examined.
On chapter 4 there will be an analysis and description of various topologies. Fur-
thermore, chapter 5 will evaluate the effectiveness of network telescopes and various
problems related to its implementations. The last part of the research is the con-
clusion. Conclusion, will focus on summarizing important parts of the research and
various observations for effective monitoring will be mentioned.
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Chapter 2
Internet Protocol Monitoring
2.1 Introduction
On this chapter, analysis of network telescope’s basic concepts will be conducted. There
will be an examination of Internet Protocol ranges and the monitoring techniques
used for observing endemic and pandemic phenomena. Also, analysis of single packet
observations will be examined. How we can characterize packets and how to use these
data. Furthermore, packets usually arrive from IP ranges monitored by a network
telescope. Therefore, analysis of observation techniques from various researchers will
be examined.
2.2 Internet Protocol ranges
IP is one of the most important protocols from the TCP/IP suite. IPv4 addresses are
logical addresses consisted of 32 bits long and have 256 possible combinations, but 0
represents the local address and 255 the broadcasts. Therefore, the real ranges of IP
are from 1 to 254 for network hosts. A part of the address is assigned to the network
and part to the host. For instance, 172.24.206.18 IP address with 255.255.0.0 subnet
has network 172.24.0.0 and host ID 206.18[85]. Unfortunately, the purpose of this
section is not to introduce IP addressing but to briefly describe classes and prefixes of
the networks, in order the reader to understand network telescopes. Whoever desires
to comprehend IP in depth, there are a lot of books and Internet sites explaining the
subject.
The IP classes are five in total. Class A is intended for large number of hosts and
especially large corporations. Furthermore, class A has a range of 1 to 126 and allows
16,777,214 hosts per network. Class B, has range from 128-191 and assigns 65,534 hosts
per network. Class C has a range of 192 to 223 and allows 254 hosts per network. Class
D, is used for multicasting purposes and has a range of 224-239. Class E, has a range of
240-255 and is used for experimental reasons mostly(Note:The class system is old. It is
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mentioned only for the purposes of efficient reading. Today, the networking community
uses the Classless InterDomain Routing(CIDR) and notations like /x, described in the
next paragraph)[85].
Therefore, the resulting addresses are 232. Hence, a /8 (Class A) network has range of
224 addresses which have in common the first 8 bits. The /16 (Class B) network, has
range of 216 addresses which have in common the first 16 bits. Moreover, a /24 (Class
C) network has 28 addresses which have in common the first 24 bits. Consequently, a
/32 address is a unique IP address. The notation / will be used later with measurement
and monitoring methods[64].
2.3 Why we need large fraction of IP addresses
Having a large amount of statistical data observers and scientists can conclude to
safe results with higher probabilities. By asking an astrophysics professor what is the
probability of seeing a rare phenomenon in the galaxy, the answer will be certain and
precise because of statistical data gathered through eons. Therefore, a scientist needs
data in order to conclude to a theory, and a theory that can be supported 100%. Also,
we as human beings in our every day life take decisions through data gathered all these
years. For instance, if a child would be asked : “If you place your hand to a heated
metal, what will happen?”, the answer is obvious because of previous knowledge and
data gathered in early years. The same with a network telescope, gathers data for
measurement, monitoring, categorization of the phenomena. Hence, if the network
telescope have available a large amount of data there could be higher probability to
detect and analyze certain phenomena.
A Network Telescope derives from the same idea as astronomical telescopes. Having
a large address space of photons arriving at the telescope, there could be a higher
probability for the telescope to observe more phenomena. Through this analogy, a
network telescope observing a large IP address space has greater probabilities and
more data for further analysis. While observing a large fraction of IP addresses, the
ability of the telescope monitoring host behavior and categorize the features of this
activity with start, end, intensity times and characterize the phenomena is becoming
higher. Clarifying this phenomenon a further example will be given. Having an IPv4
network with size of /8 , there is a p probability monitoring a target. Consequently,
the probability of monitoring a /8 network will be p8 =
1
28
= 1
256
[64].
Depending on the range of IP addresses observed the amount of traffic and data could
be quiet large[52], but generally a network telescope is able examining explosions of
large events in a network, not small events, through statistical methods[59].
Furthermore, telescopes with a broader IP address monitoring can observe events gen-
erating fewer packets, because of short duration or low sending rates. But, the accuracy
of observing start and end times of a phenomenon in a large network are higher[59].
Additionally, as it is described in figure 2.1, it can be comprehended that broader
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Figure 2.1: Monitored Addresses[59]
ranges of IP result on better conclusions through statistical models. Therefore, if a
DoS attack floods a /8 network it is possible to detect the phenomenon in less hour
given than in small telescopes with less ranges. For this purpose, further analysis will
be given in section 2.5 of chapter 2.
2.4 Targets and Events in a network
On security community, the basis on characterizing an attack is to examine the des-
tinations or the destination, the rate of the attack (e.g high worm propagation rate)
and examine various approaches for categorizing a certain phenomenon. For instance,
characterize an incident such as DoS attack with bots, a worm activity, the targeting
rates, the propagation or how many hosts infected this certain attack.
A fundamental theory in network telescopes is the idea of target and event. Further-
more, a host in a network could be a device plugged and operating automatically or
under the guidance of an operator. This device in order to communicate through the
network sends packets received by other devices. Sometimes the traffic generated could
be random and unbiased. On the other hand, because of an infectee the unsolicited
traffic generated could be the result of a Denial-of-Service attack or worm infection.
Moreover, a host selecting a destination or a target to send unsolicited traffic results
in a targeting rate. Considering that a host selects targets at a given targeting rate
results in an event [64].
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Additionally, events detected by a network telescope could be divided into classes and
effect on a network, according to Bailley et al. When an attack or an increasing probing
occurs will have an impact on a very small amount of IP addresses locally or globally
over the Internet, but this classification of the incident applies only to the target of
this event[52].
2.5 Telescope Monitoring
Observations In section 2.3, it was analyzed why a large fraction of IP addresses
needed. It was explained that a large fraction needed in order to have accurate sta-
tistical data and analyze the event in a network with higher probability and less time
than in a smaller one. This section is dedicated to the methods which a network tele-
scope make use of and these methods are analyzed in depth. Furthermore, analysis
of backscatter traffic and worm propagation activity -as it is monitored by telescopes-
will be given in chapter 3.
As it was mentioned in section 2.3, the probability of monitoring a target and an
event is needed in order to explain how a network telescope observes. Notation / is
needed and network telescopes use it in order to quickly find the probability of the
telescope monitoring a target chosen by a certain host. Therefore, the probability
p is given by a ratio of the address space monitored and the total available address
space. Consequently, for a network size /x, the p monitoring a target is : px =
1
2x
.
Having mentioned before as an example, the probability monitoring a /8 network will
be p8 =
1
28
= 1
256
[64] presenting the accuracy and the efficiency of a telescope seen
events at /8 network.
Analyzing the ability of network telescopes observing remote events it would be useful
to apprehend the duration of the events for a /x size telescope, because many phenom-
ena have targeting rates that are either fixed or relatively constrained. Phenomena
such as DoS or worm infections, the victim’s rate of response is either limited or in-
creased depending on the capabilities of the host and the network. Therefore, the
phenomena recorded must be treated as measurable quantities with targeting rates
and time duration[64]. Before analyzing the original idea of Moore et al., analysis on
various researchers’ opinions will be examined for broader understanding.
Bailey et al., implementing the idea of telescopes observed that the router or the
dynamic host server must forward packets to the monitor, since the monitor observes
the unused addresses[52]. Furthermore, Joel Sandin added that when a sensor observes
in real deployments 220 unused addresses could have good results, but by avoiding the
cost we loose in likelihood observing fault results[75]. On class A network, for instance,
the telescope monitoring results in 1/256th victim responses of spoofed addresses [59].
However, the never ending activity is an unproductive activity. Hence, two are the
most useful types of background radiation, backscatter traffic from DoS attack and
Worm activity arriving at a network telescope[34].
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Yegneswaran et al., proposed that in order the monitoring effectiveness to be highly
appreciated both unused and used addresses must be monitored. From one point of
view, packets arriving from an unused space could be the result of dropped packets
by a network’s gateway or border router. However, unused spaces offers advantages
such as observing misconfiguration packets arriving and malicious activity, thus false
positives which is a problem of Network Intrusion Detection Systems can be minimized.
Additionally, active responses from monitoring tool such as network telescope can be
used to detect precise attack information, but classes like A and B must be used to
offer better results[93].
However ,the idea using Greynets, as proposed by Harrop et al., which are a mix
of unused and used addresses has different measurement techniques and topological
observations. Therefore, definition of the potentials is needed which are the listeners
and the distribution of listeners. P is the set of IP addresses monitored. Pm, is the
set of potentials having m IP addresses and Pm is the subset of greynet topology. L is
the set of unused addresses observed and Ln represents n listening hosts. Therefore,
Ln ⇐ Pm, with n⇐ m,Ln being a subset of Pm contained within Pm. Hence, greynet
will observe packets arriving from members of Ln, with Ln << Pm. Additionally, the
Ln members will be distributed all over P. Having needed to introduce style X across
space P, because of n addresses spaced around the circumference of P, LnX is the result.
Therefore, LnX will have a rotational orientation relative to P, named θ. Consequently,
the set of listening hosts from P is described by coordinates like (LnX, θ)[38].
On the other hand, monitoring local addresses there is a possibility the traffic to be
blocked by constraints, because companies will set filters for incoming traffic. There-
fore, Cooke et al. proposed honeynet sensors as an alternative. Honeynet sensors can
be deployed in many different parts of a network near systems and critically assets of
the organization. Therefore, there is a need to examine “how big a network telescope
must be?”. The answer was given by Moore et al., who will be analyzed later. Fur-
thermore, evaluating the observations of Cooke, figure 2.2 describes the required time
observing packets from a random scanning in different ranges at 95% confidence. [19]
In order event monitoring to be more effective, a telescope can be combined with
multiple sensors distributed across the network, because malicious events can be short
lived. However, certain events such as worms can have a lifetime over an hour and can
be observed effectively by distributed telescopes[5]. Cuiy et al. observed, in a /14 plus
an additional /23 network, that malwares such as Blaster running on a host assigned
private block address will propagate very rapidly to public addresses, sending a bigger
amount of traffic to the telescope. Therefore, a magnified visibility of the telescope in
such kind of malicious traffic can be succeeded. Also, they observed that Honeyfarms,
which later will be analyzed by this report, despite monitoring a /23 network telescope
can observe more radiation background than a /14 network[23].
However, there are imperfect methods which limit the ability of monitors to represent
unique attack sources. IP addresses does not represent individuals and the mapping of
these addresses is not static; depending on the network. Furthermore, the variability
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Figure 2.2: Time needed to observe with 95% confidence [19]
of the sources observed can have an effect on the monitor [5].
Figure 2.3, describes the distribution, that over 90% of packets monitored, at each
sensor, less than 10% sent by IPs seen at the 14 telescopes [5].
Furthermore, the type of services in a network could limit the evaluation of an event.
Therefore, the packets observed it would be efficient if the scanning types can be in a
uniform matter. Additionally, as it was observed by researchers, a hybrid system or
greynet can offer greater visibility and can help to a detailed analysis [5].
Chen et al., on the other hand, show that using passive fingerprinting with monitor
sensors can examine the characteristics of a target, such as the Operating System
using. The results show that Microsoft Windows hosts are vulnerable and more fre-
quently attacked by 91% and approximatelly 7% other Operating Systems Unix-like.
Furthermore, researchers tried to recognize the top 10 targeted ports in their sensors.
They observe, that ports like 137,135,139,445 are not only vulnerable to Windows
systems. Also, while their networks were monitored, observe that well-known back-
doors are still targeted, but the most targeted ports are for web services such as port
80(http)[72].
Pang et al., on the other hand, use another approach to measure the activity of the
traffic via network telescopes. They use two approaches, taming the traffic volume and
building application-level responders. Through taming traffic volume can filter the
traffic in order to balance between traffic reduction and the information lost[68].
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Figure 2.3: Contribution of total packets observed at 14 monitors. [5]
On the other hand, by keeping the connections initiated from each host and discard
the remaining, can be an inconsistent viewing of the network because open connec-
tions create unreachable addresses. Similar to this measuring strategy, Pang et al. is
that keeps port pair connection from each source, but also creates inconsistent view.
Another strategy, is by keeping a type per source activity, but it is hard to be imple-
mented. The final way is to choose, for experimental reasons, the IP addresses and
assume that the affinity of background traffic monitored is the same like monitored
addresses[68].
Another way of monitoring with a network telescope, proposed by Bailey et al. for the
Internet Monitor Sensor, which can compute the MD5 checksum from the receiving
packets payloads observed by the sensor and analyze them basis to the payloads mon-
itored before. If the checksum or signature is already recorded, the passive monitor
logs the signature without storing the payload. On the other hand, if a new signature
is monitored, the payload and the signature observed is being stored in the database.
This method, is extremely useful for the monitoring sensor, since a /8 telescope observ-
ing and storing payloads, can reach approximately over 100GB per day. Furthermore,
the efficiency of checksumming, provides an advanced signature system that can be
used for further measurement methods. By this way, the Internet Monitor Sensor, can
differentiate the traffic and monitor with higher effectiveness worm events. Also can
detect vulnerabilities in systems, like virus and worm backdoors. Additionally, observ-
ing DDoS events, is highly efficient even with attacks that generate less traffic in a
wide range of IP addresses[4].
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Measurement Methodologies Rajab et al., to measure and sample the traffic
takes advantage of the clustered nature of the IP space. Uses the depth-first strat-
egy model and selects randomly from /8 prefixes, meaning TCP, ICMP packets or
ACK(acknowledgment) packets from popular ports. Then, if a response arrives the /8
prefix marked as active and then send packets for the /16 within the /8 network. If
there is no response, the prefix is considered inactive[74].
Then, Rajab et al. takes n samples needed to measure with high confidence. Therefore,
pl,g is the probability exploring a host in g prefix. Given the n samples the α probability
of accepting one response from a prefix g is:
α = 1− (1− pl,g)n (2.1)
The necessity of contact with at least one host on a prefix with probability α and
examine n samples is:
n =
log(1− α)
log(1− pl,g) (2.2)
Ideally, to detect live /16 prefixes from a single active host n must be large enough,
but for practicality reasons in order to detect /16 prefixes which entails active hosts
the empty or sparsely populated prefixes must be excluded. By including live prefixes
to empty, with host occupancy (pl,g) below certain β threshold, calculation can be
achieved by replacing (pl,g) with β in equation 2.2. Then it can be noticed that the
threshold increases and the samples number decreases[74].
But we have to evaluate β in order the sampling detection of live prefixes to contain
the majority of live populations. By defining β as threshold of active host occupancy
(pl,g), the sampling process can detect active prefixes containing 99% of Internet active
population. The distribution denoting the internet live population P (g) residing in a
/16 prefix is:
pl,g =
P (g) ·N
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(2.3)
, with N to be the totality of Internet live hosts. The nominator is the expected number
of hosts and the denominator is the size of prefix /16[74].
On the other hand, it can be shown base to [74] that P (g) can also be estimated
by Monte Carlo study, but considering the estimation of P (g) using an active set of
IP addresses, a small set, it can be obtained from various sources. Consequently,
with the estimation of p ∗ (g) which is the marginal distribution of P (g), which is
the distribution of active hosts at /8. Then, deriving p ∗ (g) from the accumulated
addresses, the learning set of /8 prefixes is the last step. Therefore, by collecting a
small dataset of 20,000 active addresses the estimated distribution p ∗ (g) can have
estimated error of e = 4.3× 10−5[74].
Another approach is given by Shakkottai et al. which is based on the approach us-
ing Peer-to-Peer network, to identify anomalies. In order to find an instance of worm
behavior, researchers express that a worm propagates exponentially, considering mon-
itoring M hosts. Hence, a particular infected host choosing one of the observing hosts,
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the probability is M
N
. Furthermore, the hosts monitored by all infectees is MI(t)
N
. There-
fore, this is the rate of scanning monitored systems. After that it is needed to deter-
mine the number of scans applied to observing hosts, M(t) with time interval [O, t]:
dM(t)
dt
= MI(t)
N
[79].
Bo et al., on the other hand, measures the data through network measurement and
management tools like Simple Network Management Protocol. Defines that the con-
nection grade in time interval contacting i host in n IP hosts is t. Therefore, categorizes
host i having three states. Firstly the host sends packets. Secondly, by receiving the
packets and lastly neither sending nor receiving. Furthermore, define binary time se-
ries as {W (t), t ≥ 0}.W (t) = 1, meaning that a host sending at time t packets with
W (t) = 0 when the host is not sending packets at time. Hence, {D(t, t1, t2), t1 ≤ t ≤ t2}
denotes hosts, which host i send packets from t1 to t2 and Dst(t) be the destination of
the IP address which host i sends packet at t. Then, using the connection degree:
CtTt =
∫ tT
(t−1)T
W (t)K(t)dt (2.4)
, where CtTt being the i ’s host connection degree at t. K(t) is the decision function with
K(t) = Dst(t) ⊕ D(t, 0, t − 1) and ⊕ between the variable and the vector. Supposed
having a variable and vector ( A), the definition using equation 2.4 is:
α⊕ A =
{
0 α ∈ A
1 α /∈ A
[11]
Another method of obtaining sampling is the Sample and Hold. Sample and Hold
identifies flows larger than a specified threshold and it is based on random sampling
and a table containing hashes to observe flow ID’S and byte counts. Arriving packets
are sampled and maintained in the table. After that, packets belong to a flow are
counted. This approach unfortunately results to both false positive and negatives,
but its accuracy can be very high. Therefore, it is needed to accurately identifying
the flows T% confiscate link’s capacity. Oversampling factor O is selected for false
negatives reduction. Hence, it is resulted in HTlen =
1
T
∗ O location in the hash
table. The sampling rate is set as HTlen/C, with C being the maximum capacity of
transmission in a link over specified period[93].
Moreover, subnet selection is based on network and bandwidth constraints. If the
mean is known and the variance of a traffic volume, then it is possible to divide the
bandwidth by this and take the monitored subnets available. After selecting samples
the detection ability problem is amongst the most serious, defining the accuracy of
telescope. Considering an unbiased estimator τ̂ of a total population of τ , the estimated
τ̂ variance is: var(τ̂) = N2
[
(N−n
N
)σ
2
n
+ (1−p
p
)µ
n
]
where the total number of subnets is N,
the sample is n, µ the median and σ2 variance of the population, with p the probability
of detecting a host[93].
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Figure 2.4: Probability of observing at least one packet[64]
Moore’s law, lastly, is the most prevalent because of the modeling and the observations
made. Moore, categorizes the ability of the telescope and analyzes from simple methods
to complicated. Through Moore’s work was explained how a telescope observes single
packets, multiple and start/end precision times. Therefore, the probability of detecting
a single packet when a host chooses IP addresses uniformly randomly is a geometric
distribution. When a host sends numerous packets, the packets seen from the network
telescope is a binomial distribution with p parameter. When a network telescope
monitors a fraction of IP space, this fraction is mentioned asp. Assuming that target
IP choices made by a host are unconstrained and having p odds of each packet send
to the telescope is by definition a Bernouli trial[64].
Considering the packets generated by a host as the product of rate packets sent r,
multiplied by the elapsed time T. The probability observing at least one packet in T
secs is P (t ≤ T ) = 1− (1− p)rT [64].
As it can be observed from figure 2.4, the probability observing at least one packet from
a host selecting random IP addresses at 10 probes per second ,on different telescopes,
shows the likelihood of observing events[64].
Furthermore, T (elapsed time) before observing a packet of an event with Z probability
is: T = −1
r log 1
z
(1−p) . Until the first packet observed the expected packets seen are µN =
1
p
,
with variance of σ2N =
1−p
p2
. Because of our interest on rates and time, the replacement
of an absolute number of packets sent with rT and solve for elapsed time is: µT =
1
rp
.
Consequently, depending on the size of the telescope depends also the likelihood to
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Table 2.1: Times on different /x sizes observe their first packet from a host choosing
IP addresses at 10/sec IP addresses[64]
observe an event. For instance, observing a Code-Red-like infected host sending one
or multiple packets on a /8 with 99.999% probability is 4.9 minutes[64].
Table 2.1 represents the standard deviation and median times, summarizing on average,
in order to observe a packet from a host choosing random targets at 10/sec for different
sizes of telescopes. If the table is noticed, it can be observed that monitoring an IP
address at /32 the average of observing a host at 10 addresses/sec is over 13 years with
95% likelihood at 40 years. The 95% column represents the duration of an event on
which a network telescope could monitor effectivelly 95% of the events. On the contrary,
the 5% column shows that the telescope would miss 95% of the events[64].
From another point of view, monitoring two dissimilar IP addresses p1, p2 and compar-
ing time T1, T2 given for detecting at least one packet P at rate r is:
1− (1− p1)rT1 = P = 1− (1− p2)rT2
T1 = T2
ln(1−p2)
ln(1−p1)
Due to increasing mass in the distribution the detection would not scale linearly. There-
fore, a /1 is better than a /2, while /2 takes 2.41 times to detect one or multiple packets
at the same level of a /1[64].
Network telescope’s ability to condense significant events from background traffic for
multiple packets, is one of the utilities which the telescope has. Thus, our confidence
of observing an event increases. Therefore, a telescope often must receive k or more
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packets from an event in order to accurately classify them. Depending on the event
monitored and the design, a threshold of k packets selected with a probability of
monitoring k or multiple packets out of transmitted N packets is: P (saw ≥ k) =
1−∑k−1y=0 (Ny )py(1− p)N − y. Thus, if 100 packets from a DoS attack can be observed
on a /8 telescope with 500pps last for 1 minute is:
N = 1000pps · 60sec = 30000packets
k = 100packets
p = 2−8
P = 1−∑99y=0 (30000y ) (2−8)y(1− 2−8)30000−y
P = 95.2%
[64].
However, the importance to know start and end times of an event and duration is
highly understood. The first packet observed is the upper limit of the start time and
the lower limit is based on the last object observed. Therefore, if the start and end
times are known, there is a higher likelihood for a telescope to examine an event and the
time of the duration of the event. For instance, with a network telescope monitoring
at a /8 there could be 99% confidence for an event with targeting rate at 10 addresses
per second, that the event began two minutes before the first packet arrived. Hence, if
the chosen IP ranges are independent and monitored by a telescope with p probability,
the probability that N targets chosen outside telescope ranges even before the first
observed destination is: (1−p)N . Furthermore, the address choises are Bernouli trials,
but if the network telescope observing a packet at a time, possible start times can be
described by geometric distribution[64].
Additionally, estimating host’s targeting rates from targets observed, obtaining certain
boundaries could be useful. Therefore, rates can be determined exactly if the values of
duration are known, the total number of targets and by having a binomial distribution
with p parameter expressing the totality during an event with a host choosing N targets
and the number of targets monitored. The expected monitored targets is: µ = Np
with σ2 = Np(1 − p) variance. Also, p << 1, σ2 ≈ Np when N is large and the
binomial distribution can be approximated by normal or Poisson distribution. Finding
a distribution for the totality of targets N, observing n targets, an inverse problem is
remaining. With P [n|N ] given by binomial distribution requires knowing P [N ] and
P [n], known as priori. Consequently, this allows the estimation of N̂ = n
p
when N is
large and the observed n is also large and the distribution is considered by normality
for large network telescopes[64].
2.6 Summary
In this section, the usefulness of IP addresses and ranges for a network telescope were
analyzed. There was an examination of why we need large fraction of IPs and how
these ranges can be used for effective monitoring. Furthermore, there was an analysis
on various techniques for packet characterization and observation. In conclusion, there
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was an examine of Moore et al. ideas who were the first implementing the idea of a
network telescope.
26
Chapter 3
Endemic and Pandemic Incidents
3.1 Introduction
Endemic and Pandemic Incidents are the most important phenomena not only for ob-
serving them through a network telescope, but also as Internet phenomena that causes
either overloading of network and resources or economical disasters. Endemic incidents
are the DoS and DDoS phenomena caused by the attackers usually for vendetta reasons
or to overload a network and hosts for economical reasons. On the other hand, Inter-
net Worms (Pandemic incidents) are self propagating programs that cause overloads
of networks or resources and usually their targets are governmental, military sites or
database vulnerabilities. Worms such as CodeRed, Blaster and Witty, consider to be
the most characteristic.
DoS attacks , usually, are generated from random sources. The packets observed are
called “backscatter” packets and can be monitored across Internet, because of the
uniformity which are characterized. In single targets, DoS can be observed as noise
packets, but if collected in a properly installed network telescope, the backscatter and
DoS attack can be clearly observed. On the other hand, worm attacks have similar
patterns but to larger network spaces. Hence, both these attacks, DoS and Worms,
can be observed either locally or globally through proper measurement and monitoring
techniques such as network telescopes [65].
Thus, in this section, pandemic and endemic incidents will be analyzed through the
view of telescope researchers. Analysis of DoS and DDoS attacks, and the backscat-
ter packets observed by different sensors(blackholes) will be analyzed. Furthermore,
Internet Worms and their behavior through the propagation face will be examined.
In conclusion, there will be a further analysis on propagation models and how these
models used for monitoring purposes.
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3.2 Endemic Incidents
Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service
Denial-of-Service and Distributed Denial-of-Service, in the past years up to recently,
are used as a tool to overload the network of a competitor or for vendetta reasons
to overload network and resources of Internet sites such as yahoo.com. The attacker,
usually, compromises a host and from this point starts sending packets to the target
depending on the attack flooding technique used. In this section, the analysis of DoS
and DDoS phenomenon from the point of view of the researchers will be examined. Not
from the point of view of the researchers working on endemic incidents, but from the
point of network telescope researchers. For instance, how the phenomenon is observed
and how it was analyzed from a network telescope.
DoS attacks In DoS attacks the attacker spoofs IP addresses randomly and floods
the targets with requests. The target responds believing that the sender is a legitimate
user[59]. By spoofing techniques, attackers manage to conceal their identity in order
to send their packets. Therefore, it seems that the packets arrive from more than
one third parties. Furthermore, it was observed that the attacker can use the true IP
address without spoofing a host[61].
Additionally, in DDoS or DoS attacks, the attacking hosts connects to the victim and
appoints separate requests. Therefore, the target must maintain, through the process-
ing power, all the connections created the overwhelm of the system. The target, also,
tries to maintain the socket buffers of the TCP connections. Furthermore, this process
creates CPU and network resources to be consumed[76]. On the other hand, Bailey et
al. from the Internet Monitor Sensor research describes DoS as the denial of legitimate
hosts to access resources and the attack has the ability either to crash the computing
resource or to overwhelm every resource. DDoS attacks rely on this technique, but also
consumes network resources and relies on large hosts assistant[4].
On figure 3.1, it can be observed that two large scale attacks against www.sco.com
of the SCO Group on December 10,2003. The attacks use randomly spoofed hosts;
Internet Motion Sensor was able to observe further backscatter data. There were
classified 5 events, which 3 of them were against the web servers and two against the
FTP and SMTP server. This figure shows clearly, if observed, the spectrum analysis
as monitored by the Internet Monitor Sensor[4].
Furthermore, Moore et al. categorized DoS attacks into two categories. Those attacks
which are flow-based and keyed on IP address and protocol, in which during the phe-
nomenon, flow is defined with parameters like minutes, threshold and timeout. On
the other hand, the event-basis is an event which can be observed for approximately
a minute in a window, and there is no notion of the duration[56]. Additionally, one
of the characteristics of DoS attack is that it consumes resources of the host or from
the network, which serves legitimate purposes. Moore et al. characterized the DoS
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Figure 3.1: December 2003 www.sco.com attacks as monitored by IMS [4]
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Figure 3.2: Backscatter Illustration [61]
attacks into logic and resource attacks. Logic attacks exploit existing vulnerabilities
and cause servers either to crash or degrade their performance. Ping-of-death, is one
kind of these attacks and can be avoided by upgrading software and sequences of pack-
ets. Resource attacks degrade the resources of the device or of the network by sending
spurious requests. Defending against these kind of attacks, it can be difficult since
distinguishing the requests can be complicated[61]. Furthermore, resource attacks has
either as characteristic loading the network or impact on victim’s CPU. Most of the
attackers tries to overload the network by sending more packets to the devices more
from which can process. At the same time, the attacker tries to overload the process-
ing power of a device by requiring from the device to process more packets than can
receive. One of the best known DoS attacks is the SYN flood. Generally DoS attacks
try to find vulnerabilities and exploit them through a system. Today, sophisticated
attacks focus mostly on infrastructure, backbone devices such as routers and database
servers[61].
Usually, DoS attacks are randomly generated by programs which select addresses to
spoof and send packets at random . The target having received the spoofed packet
sends a response packet to the source claimed or to a network device which tries to
reply, usually, with an ICMP message. At the end, these messages will be send to the
randomly generated spoofed address or addresses. Furthermore, the source address be
selected at random and the target’s response will be distributed through a wide address
space creating the “backscatter” effect[61].
In figure 3.2 a simple backscatter illustration is described when the attacker sends SYN
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packets toward the victim using spoofed addresses. While receiving the packets, the
target tries to reply with SYN/ACK packets to the sources of the spoofed devices or
hosts[61]. Furthermore, it was observed that 90-94% of the attacks are TCP and 43%
approximately ICMP and the majority of the attacks are on multiple ports and few
on services provided from HTTP and IRC. Additionally, flooding DoS attacks such as
SYN and ICMP floods was examined that it can be succeeded through the spoofing
of addresses randomly and through major attack tools. The targets respond, and
then the usolicited responses or backscatter data accross the network or to internet
space which can be monitored. The received backscatter is the event for a network
telescope[56].
According to McPherson et al., in their experiments with network telescopes, it was
observed that attackers use allocated blocks and invalid addresses. Therefore, it might
be extremely useful to recognize the ranges of spoofed addresses and install a filter
to classify the source addresses. Furthermore, they select from a /32 network an
address from a different range and advertise it to a network telescope. The workstation
was monitoring and keeping logs through the use of a tool such as Arbor Network’s
Dark IP Application[53]. In addition, it was observed that event rates described the
attack intensity, but not the attack duration. Therefore, measuring the duration attack
through traces can be beneficial for a network telescope[61]. On the other hand, while
the intensity of the attacks can be characterized, it is not easily sustained the ability
to count the time of the attack. Moore et al., found that most of the attacks has short
duration time. Less than 10 minutes were 50% of the attacks and 80% less than 30
minutes. However, 90% even with less than an hour, the duration of the attack can be
more than 5 hours and 10 hours or can be activated for multiple days[65].
Moreover, from a network telescope it was monitored that there is a significant per-
centage that shows attacks on dial up and broadband devices are larger than others.
Attacks, especially on dial up hosts, can be rated with thousands of packets per sec-
ond. Therefore, it could be concluded that these DoS attacks are for personal vendet-
tas. Furthermore, more attacks can be observed to Internet Relay Chat users which
can support multi-player games. 2-3% has been observed that attacks were directed
on name servers and 1-3% to backbone routers. This can be really disturbing, since
overwhelming a backbone router can cause permanent Denial of Service. Additionally,
was observed that attacks are also directed to bellwether sites such as aol.com and
amazon.com[65]. Moreover, the DNS lookup of the top-level domains show that over
10% targets were com and net, whereas 1.3-1.7% were edu and org. Consequently, com
and net top-level domains are targeted mostly because of the commercial use. On the
other hand, country domains also were targeted. For instance, Romania and Brazil,
countries with limitation in networking infrastructure had frequently attacked in the
past[61].
The classification of DNS name with target IP address can be observed in table 3.1.
Unfortunately, the majority of the names could not be classified because the criteria do
not match or the reverse mapping is not possible. In order to conclude and observe in
better results of the source or targeting addresses, data from 2001 and 2002 are selected
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Table 3.1: Association of DNS name and target IP address[61]
and analysis of 100 target host names will be analyzed. Therefore, the categorization
of target addresses can be realized. Furthermore, through this analysis it can be
observed that approximately half of targets could be broadband users and 10% dial
up. The 5-10% of targets were educational networks and a small percentage could be
internet centers. The majority show that usual targets were either home users or small
businesses. From this experiment, it can be observed that severe attacks are directed
towards dial up or broadband users with thousands of packets per second. Actually,
DoS attacks were directed for personal vendettas, for instance to users running IRC,
multi-player games or even to sites needed parental advisory. Additionally, reverse DNS
mappings were compromised as it was observed. Furthermore, network infrastructures
can be attacked. Routers and name servers were attacked with rates 1.3% and 1.7% and
compromised with a number of packets greater than could resolve. Hence, the router
overwhelmed denied services and could also denied the connectivity. Moreover, attacks
were observed to larger sites in particularly yahoo.com and amazon.com[61].
Table 3.2, describes attack protocols found in tracing procedures to allocate the source
of the event. The backscatter event as monitored by a network telescope. The attack
and the backscatter number packets can be observed. The majority of 93% and 88%
were using TCP as protocol while a smaller percentage of 2.6% show which attacks
were using ICMP packets, but on average was twice the number of TCP packets. The
remaining of the attacks had a combination of different protocols per attack[61].
On the other hand, table 3.3 describes the monitored TCP attacks per service per
target observed. The overall shows, popular TCP services, but having the majority of
attacks targeted on multiple ports which were well defined through the port ranges,
services such as HyperText Transfer Protocol (80), IRC(6667) and ports like 113 and
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Table 3.2: Attack Protocols found at trace analysis by Moore et al.[61]
Table 3.3: TCP attacks per target ports[61]
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0[61].
DDoS attacks DDoS is a phenomenon of multiple compromised systems, attacking
to a single target, causing denial of legitimate resources. The flood phenomenon can
crash the system, if the capacity of requests is greater than the processing capability of
the target. Therefore, the requests of the victims are lost in the unsolicited traffic[76].
In addition, in DDoS attacks, attackers in order to succeed maximum attack rate,
combine the resources of multiple hosts. The attackers compromise a set of Internet
hosts by installing a service or a daemon either manually or automated, to create
“bots” and attack in full scale. This service allows the remote control by the attacker
and variants of attacks. Through this daemon, the attacker can succeed coordinated
attack with all the compromised hosts[61].
Andersson et al., according to his Internet draft for the unwanted traffic in 2006,
observed that DDoS traffic can be originated from everywhere on the Internet. In
particular, regions with pipes and poorly managed hosts were used for the launch of
these kind of attacks. Meanwhile, attackers preferred devices with large returns with
the minimal processing effort. Furthermore, it was observed that backbone devices
could easily absorb these kind of attacks without a serious impact on the network.
However, DDoS attacks had a significant impact on end-hosts, with traffic arriving
from many different directions [2].
On the other hand, Bouzida et al. by describing the architecture of a typical DDoS
distinct the names of masters and slaves. The attacker begins a new session with a
master host and the service is launched. This daemon can offer many facilities, so the
attacker can have the opportunity to launch the desired attack. After the connection
with the master host, the attacker launches the attack to one or many victims through
the master. The master, after receiving the proper commands, sends notices to the
slaves and launch a great scale of attack. Furthermore, the slaves send a notice to
the master to inform for their condition(alive or not)[12]. Tools such as Shaft, TFN,
TFKN2k, trinoo, were one of the most popular distributed attack tools. The target
sends the reply to the source believing that is an appropriate response[65].
Moreover, Darmohray et al. refers that DoS attacks recently could be very challenging
even to secure sites. Attackers use DDoS to gain an appropriate amount of processing
power and cover their traces through other hosts. Through their experiment, it was
observed that a traditional firewall can accept up to 500 SYNs per second, and if
the attack is persistent and more than 500 SYNs, then the host can be temporarily
unavailable[24]. It was observed that the speed of these attacks could reach up to 1.8-20
connection attempts/sec, by absorbing 2000-32000 bits/second. Even if these attacks
seem not highly dangerous, the combination of hosts creates significant problems. In
addition, it was observed that the generation of less data quantity helps to the difficulty
of the detection of these attacks. On the other hand, by sending large quantities,
it might be helpful, but it could be noticed more easily[76]. In conclusion, it must
be mentioned that DDoS attacks can be long lived if combined with smaller events.
Consequently, an address diversity is needed , mostly, in order a network telescope to
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accurately determine the range and the continuity of an attack[4].
Backscatter Analysis
Backscatter analysis was the first method to analyze unsolicited packets from DoS or
DDoS attacks. Moore et al., were the first used and developed this method basis to
the research conducted. Unfortunately, the models measuring these endemic incidents
through a network telescope are not plenty. Thus, backscatter analysis is used by
most of the researchers and it is the main method for measuring this kind of activity
through a telescope. We are referred to this, because our reader already read many
times the name Moore et al., so far. Therefore, the opinions of these researchers are
more important, because they were the first implementing and analyzing methodologies
for a network telescope.
Grace et al., describes that backscatter is the excess of DoS attack. This excess derives
from SYN flood which is a stream of TCP/SYN packets sent to the target. When
attacker sends TCP/SYN packets from spoofed sources, the SYN packet received from
the victim is for synchronization on a new connection. If the source was not found,
the target will try allocation of new structures for the connection. Hence, if the tar-
get replies with SYN/ACK, the traffic becomes backscatter. Therefore, backscatter
analysis is crucial, because of the approximation of accuracy provided by DoS activity.
On the other hand, there is few information available since companies do not report
this kind of private and sensitive information for further research[34]. Figure 3.3 is
a basic scenario of backscatter principle. The attacker already uses three hosts with
spoofed addresses. One is an active host and the other two are passive and observed
by a network telescope[31].
Moore et al., by the use of backscatter analysis, had observed 2000-3000 per week
DoS attacks and for a period of three years monitored 22 traces revealing 68,700 at-
tacks. Also, estimated the boundaries of these attacks in which the excess of these
were over 100,000 packets/second[61]. Moreover, Yegneswaran et al. by examining In-
ternet Sinks use backscatter analysis. The backscatter data were DoS attack responses
and they were used before for the characterization of attack behaviors. Furthermore,
through their experiments from Internet Service Providers observe that TCP packets
with ACK/RST flag were the most usual response to a SYN flood. In figure 3.4 - a
time series graph of backscatter volumes monitored from a service provider network
telescope over 12 hours period- the vertical lines describe the less most usual duration
spikes of SYN attacks. The ICMP TTL packets, can be manipulated either as loops
created by routers or DoS attacks with lower starting Time To Live(TTL)[93].
Furthermore, with the active sink placed to the service provider, they had the op-
portunity to conduct SMTP analysis. They observed that there were specific address
attracting large SMTP scans with range of 20-50 scans/second. Therefore, they con-
cluded that by creating hot-spots in a network telescope range could be a good source
of misconfiguration. With further observations from the telescope found that cable-
35
Figure 3.3: A simplified version of Backscatter[31]
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Figure 3.4: Service Provider’s Sink observing backscatter data over 12 hrs period[93]
modem and DSL subscribers where the original source of these scans, but when they
set up an SMTP responder, in order to find the source, discover that the source was a
major vendor and that the emails received were firewall logs[93].
On the other hand, McPherson et al. in order to capture the activity of unsolicited data
and analyze it propose that query blocks of addresses must be advertised . Then, by
the use of a traffic collector such as TCPdump and static query collector, there is high
possibility the backscatter data will be gathered and monitored from this block[53].
However, backscatter hypothesis can be biased through the port scanning packets ar-
riving at a network telescope. This was observed, because not all TCP RST packets
were backscatter data. Therefore, it might be needed verification through a vast ma-
jority of sites observing the same phenomenon[59].
Pang et al., in their analysis, observed that the majority of the scans were TCP RSTs
and SYN/ACK. Hence, these responses in vast majority were coming from flood at-
tacks such as SYN-floods. Their analysis based on a /8 network, resulted in better
conclusions. A significant portion of unreached messages showed that the flow arrived
from spoofed source addresses from port specific in particular 53 and 1026. The first
thought was from DNS poisoning, but these UDP packets can be observed in many
networks[68]. Moreover, according to Francois et al. and their research, there was
a large amount of monitored addresses which should never appear on the Internet.
These misconfiguration were either of routers or firewalls that could be deficient de-
vices. Furthermore, they conducted a backscatter analysis and compared the results
found with active addresses. Also, they observed that multicast addresses where used
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Figure 3.5: Estimation of attacks/hour[65]
as source addresses which could only be used as destination addresses. Further to the
research, they observed that many of the unsolicited packets monitored by a network
telescope were from misconfigured routers/firewalls/NAT from targets. Additionally,
there was also an observation from Honeypot data. They observed that had different
results through the private network and there was a possibility that these unsolicited
traffic were arriving from misconfiguration of the local network[31].
Moreover, in order to describe the results of various measurements with backscatter
analysis, figure 3.5 will be described. Figure 3.5, is time series graph of targets through-
out three traces collected over one hour period. The gaps in the graph corresponds to
the gaps of the traces in one hour periods. If it is observed the 02/20 (Feb 20), there
is more than 150 targeted addresses per hour which were attacks against the hosts in
the network monitored. Also it can be observed that the ratio increased above five in
certain occasions[65].
Further to the analysis of DoS unsolicited data, Carl et al. described that monitoring
packet headers in a network could be useful for activity profiling. They defined it as the
average packet rate of a flow which consecutive packets of similar fields are consisted.
The time between consecutive packets describes the activity level. Therefore, the
measurement of network activity could be found by the result of the sum over average
packet rates of inbound and outbound flows. Furthermore, analysis of UDP and TCP
services must be included in order the number of flows to be determined. Also, they
clustered the similar flows in order to determine the summation of constituent flows.
Additionally, they described that spoofing results to a finite probability which the
monitored range of addresses will accept packets from unsolicited traffic. They also
referred to Laura Feinstein et al. that focus on activity and the uniformity of addresses.
They clustered basis to addresses of the flows of the targeting hosts behind monitoring
points[33].
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Moore: The backscatter analysis Moore et al. was the first researcher who
referred to this method. Moreover, referred to backscatter analysis as the probability
of a host on a network (local or global) of receiving, an unsolicited response from
a target is 1 − (1 − 1
232
)m, assuming a reliable delivery and for every packet in an
attack there is at least one response, during m packets of attack. Hence, if n addresses
monitored the probability of the observance of a packet from attack is: 1− (1− n
232
)m.
Therefore, the unsolicited responses observed through an attack with m packets is m
232
,
in a single host. By observing n addresses the expectation of responses monitored:
E(X) = nm
232
[61]. Furthermore, it was mentioned that the estimation of an attack
rate could be calculated by the multiplication of the average rate of arrivals of the
unsolicited(backscatter) data by 256. By this method, it was found that 50% of atacks
have a packet rate more than 350 packets/second and intense attacks over 679,000
packets/sec[65].
Therefore, by observing an address range that is large enough sampling techniques
becoming effective. In this sampling the identity of the target, the kind of attack and a
timestamp are properly fitted for the attack duration estimates. By using R ≥ R′ 232
n
, it
could be observed the average arrival rate of backscatter data monitored by the address
range, in order to estimate the attack rate focused on the target. R’, is the average
rate arriving as backscatter from the target and R is the conceived rate of attack in
packets/second[61].
In addition, researchers in order to extract the packets from a backscatter phenomenon
removed the packets from legitimate hosts monitored by the network telescope. After
that, removal of response traffic that did not correspond was needed. Furthermore,
removed TCP RST packets used for scanning, because port scan activity does not
consist as response traffic. However, RST scanning can be used to infer policy rules
of firewalls. Therefore, it is preferably to exclude this kind of packets since there is
no reflection of DoS attacks. Hence, they used scanning techniques to remove TCP
RSTs. Additionally, they performed aggressive duplicate packet suppression in order to
assure that packets were multiplied either on network or from DoS attack targets. The
removal of packets with same flow tuple was necessary. For ICMP errors extraction of
IP address, protocol and ports was needed[61].
Moreover, after the backscatter data received, aggregation was needed, because aggre-
gation of data is not a simple technique and technical challenges appear. For instance,
attacks with TCP and ICMP could be classified together or separated. Furthermore,
the problem of starting and ending time was arise, because in variability a threshold
can be biased of analysis between attacks of longer duration and low packets will be
biased through a large number of attacks with high rates. Therefore, knowledge of
the attack or of the adversary intentions was needed, otherwise an active classification
system was not possible to work properly[61].
On the other hand, the identification through a flow method is commonly used for
Internet traffic successfully. Hence, flow can be determined as the series of consecutive
packets with the same targeting IP address shared. Therefore, the first packet observed
creates a flow for a target and association with the target of that flow if the network
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Figure 3.6: Sensitinity on attacks bases to the flow parameter[61]
telescope observes the packets within timeouts of this flow. Therefore, parameters are
needed and can influence the outcomes, because longer attacks with shorter timeout
leads to a bigger amount of short attacks. Hence, backscatter data arriving from the
target, arrive from the same flow, have a timeout flow that defines the maximum
interval of two packets. The flow timeout determines the start and ending of flows
and notes that smaller flows partition continuous backscatter traffic into smaller ones.
Figure 3.6, describes the attack to a range values for the timeout parameter. As it is
observed, the curve describes the number of attack flows that changes when variety
between 60 sec to two hours of timeout parameter exists[61].
After the partition of the packets into flows, there were three more parameters that
could help to the classification of these attacks: packet threshold, attack duration and
packet rate. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis can be used. When the values vary, the
default values of parameters can be used and attained from the analysis. Consequently,
in order to classify a flow the packets threshold is needed. Packet threshold defines the
minimum packets observed in a flow for classification attack. There must be a filter
for attacks in order smaller attacks that have greater impact on a host to be detected.
Therefore, biased collection must be avoided[61].
Therefore, the attack duration which is an attack’s flow satisfying the time duration
threshold and the minimum time among start and end packets in a flow is needed
for classification. Furthermore, filtering short attacks that have impact on victim are
preferable instead of large durations which can not be qualified easily[61].
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Figure 3.7: Sensitivity of flows to the duration parameter[61]
Figure 3.7, describes the sensitivity of counting flows base to the attack duration. If
the curve is observed, there is a connection with the number of flows and the attack du-
ration. Depending on the duration, varying from one second to an hour, the flows also
depend. Also, it can be observed that durations less than 100 seconds are insensitive
to the number of flows[61].
If the attack has a certain threshold of maximum rate of packets during the flow, then
it can be classified successfully. Therefore, if the rate is more than a minute there are
enough packets for classification. Hence, the flow of the packets must be greater than
the threshold of packet rate. This is because larger packets thresholds conclude into
less qualification of the attacks. Also, by filtering, the attacks can be classified into
ones with the greatest impact[61].
Further to the specification of extracted packets, there must be an examination. While
there is an examination, extraction can be arranged by observing the protocols. There-
fore, in an IP protocol packet such as TCP, UDP can be extracted. Also, in TCP flags
such as SYN/ACK and ICMP payloads which contain information about addresses,
protocols and ports can be extremely helpful to organize a database in which the
records can characterize each attack. Furthermore, this database could be used for
further analysis of the attacks[61].
On the other hand, in order to validate the data needs a further examination to increase
the confidence. Furthermore, there is an emphasis that not all packets provoke a
certain response. Therefore, some of these packets cannot be used for monitoring
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and probing. Additionally, to their investigation they use the Anderson-Darling test
for the determination of the distributed addresses that observed in each attack with
uniform distribution. It was observed from datasets of a /16, that 98% of targeting
IPs, backscatter analysis had almost a definite level of correspondence if the data were
enough for evaluation and examination[61].
3.3 Pandemic Incidents
One of the worst threats today in the Internet are worms, which are easily created
and have high probability to cause major damage. They can flash the BIOS, mod-
ify the system and sometimes conclude to DoS attacks and reveal crucial personal
data[56].
Internet Worms
In recent years, one of the most dangerous threats in a network or all over the Internet
are worms. Programs spreading without human help and overload networks and critical
resources. Worms such as CodeRed I/II had specific targets usually Internet sites and
resources for instance databases. The damages left were many of the times critical
and economical disasters in banking systems happened. In this section, various worms
and how they observed through a network telescope will be described. Description and
analysis of worms basis to the epidemiological models and worm models in extent will
not be examined.
Worm is a self-replicating/propagating program which exploits vulnerabilities without
human intervention in order to infect hosts. The infected hosts continue the propaga-
tion and the spread of the worm. This also could be observed through figure 3.8[56].
Malicious programs such as worms send copies of itself to many locations over the In-
ternet and a network. A network telescope has the ability to observe the frequency of
these packets and compute the propagation in the network(global or local)[34].
Furthermore, there are few worm classifications as categorized from researchers which
can help us understand the propagation models in the next section. The contagion
worm propagates parasitically through normal communication channels. It can use
exploits by infecting servers and vulnerable hosts’ browsers. Additionally, it can
propagate through peer-to-peer networks. On the other hand, a worm is not always
needed to scan randomly. Meta-server worm, in particular, request the server for in-
fected hosts and topological worms spread through the infected targets possessing local
information[69].
Singh et al., in their report for the EarlyBird System detecting worms proposed a
different way of classifying the worms. They classified worms basis to multi-packet
or single packet payload. The “substantial volume of identical traffic” worms has the
characteristic that there is a stage before the initial traffic in order to infect further
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Figure 3.8: Worm activity[56]
hosts in a network before full infection. The “rising infection levels”, describes the
steady increase of sources and destinations for infection. The “random probing”, make
use of infected source to propagate by attempting to communicate randomly at certain
ports and exploit services[81].
Moreover, the spread modeling for an active worm is the simultaneous scans and at-
tempts for exploiting vulnerable hosts. When a vulnerability is found probes the hosts
and copies itself to the vulnerable host. Then the infected host tries to infect other
hosts, but when the worm phenomenon reaches unused address spaces its functional-
ity stops. On the other hand, when users try to reboot the system and kill services
or daemons because of the limited resources the system becomes more vulnerable and
continues the infection. Additionally, when the worm will be found and the host will be
patched properly the system recovers. Furthermore, it was observed that the attackers
usually scan for vulnerable hosts before the release and create potential vulnerable
hosts lists. Then the worm scans the lists and infects vulnerable systems in a network.
After the infection of the hit-list(list of vulnerable hosts) is finished, worm will use
hosts for propagation and as a base for further infections[17]. According to [59], worm
attacks randomly generate addresses from vulnerable hosts already infected. With
the network telescope, researchers managed to monitor 1/256th of all addresses and
observed the worm traffic[59].
Furthermore, it was observed that malwares and especially worms have a preference
to nearby addresses, such as Blaster and Nimda[52]. Cuiy et al., through a network
telescope capture 66 different worms and unique fingerprints of 14 different categories.
It was observed that most executables monitored had association directly with the
worm[23]. Moore et al., with a network telescope in 2001, observed the release of a
self-propagating worm that was able to compromise 360,000 hosts in half a day and then
could load a DoS attack against government site. Each worm followed from then showed
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Figure 3.9: Payload Cache over 5 months [3]
an improve and some where using vulnerabilities that other worms left[65].
On the other hand, detection of worm attacks might be difficult, because architects
of these programs add random filters by making the payload before and after the
exploit useless. Also, worms could spread in many networks and the fragmentation
created might be different in any case. Furthermore, it was observed that many worm
programmers program in binary and the infected hosts can rewrite exploits at each
point. Additionally, a worm can use contagion methods in order to slowly spread with
the use of the minimum memory requirements[81].
According to Bailey et al., in order to effectively monitor worms or threats arriving
at the network telescope, proposed that because there are many payloads observed it
would be efficient if new payloads are only stored. Also, it was proposed to store only
the MD5 hash of payloads and only store payloads of unique hash functions. Figure 3.9
describes the percentage of payload packets in Cache over 5 months at three different
sensors. It can be observed that 95% of hits at the cache were signature hits and most
of the payloads had already observed at previous times.
Bailey et al., with their research on Internet Monitor Sensor, described worms as stand-
alone programs that are self-propagating and with the help of network as medium scan
for vulnerable hosts and exploited them with the use of host interaction. Furthermore,
they refer that network telescopes are useful in order to characterize, measure and
track threats over a specific range. Internet Monitor Sensor provided an insight to
44
Figure 3.10: Blaster 3 phase lifecycle: as observed by the IMS[4]
worm behavior. Worm behavior -basis to the research- distinct through worm viru-
lence (traffic flow resulted and paths congested), worm demographics(hosts infected and
where; operating systems and bandwidth using), worm propagation and community re-
sponse(policies employed for worm; affected organizations and responses; still infected
hosts). As an example of the IMS analysis was the Blaster worm. Blaster affected
Windows 2000 and XP running DCOM RPC services by using a buffer overflow vul-
nerability. It was observed that 60% of the addresses generated by Blaster were random
and 40% located at /16 network and then the worm scan sequentially. The observed
traffic gave information valuable for the release and propagation of Blaster[4].
Figure 3.10 is an illustration of 3 phase Blaster lifecycle, using SYN to TCP on a /8
network at port 135. The phase that first observed is the growth and describes the rate
based up to hundreds of thousands infections per hour. The decay phase which was the
second phase describes the filtering implementations used to stop the spread of Blaster.
The last one was the persistence of Blaster which continued in all 2004[4].
The IMS was able to monitor 286,000 IP addresses and described the characteristics of
Blaster. Domain inspections showed that .net, .jp, .com were infected seriously. The
10% monitored showed that were dynamical assigned IPs. Also, it was observed that
domaim inspections had a maximum growth rate of 40,000 hosts/hour. At the sec-
ond phase, Blaster activity showed that it was start fading after the countermeasures
taken. Furthermore, it was observed that Blaster wasn’t aggressive such as Slammer
and Witty. Furthermore, from the Blaster analysis found that it utilized TCP and
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Figure 3.11: Horizontal and vertical scans, of coordinated distribution for June 2002[88]
thus tracking and characterization by passive network telescopes can be extremely dif-
ficult. Passive telescope were able to monitor SYN packets but not payloads. Further,
IMS because accepted the first payload was able to differentiate the worm’s variants.
Additionally, IMS had the ability to monitor the new services installed with the worm
attack and allowed the collection of payloads and scans[4].
On the other hand, worms such as Bagle and MyDoom, spreading on 2004, used ports
such as TCP 2745 and 3127 respectively were monitored successfully over a week period
in a /24 network monitored by the IMS. The top port captured was 2745/TCP and
3127/TCP for MyDoom. Also, it was observed from the behavior of these worms that
MyDoom might change and new software uploaded[4]. Furthermore, Yegneswaran et
al., by monitoring the attempts of intrusions on the Internet, observed that network
telescopes (monitoring destination ports) could be an effective way of monitoring. They
mentioned that many intrusions were monitored days before the events. The most
highly rated ports found to be 80, 1443, 137, of CodeRed, Nimda, Slapper, SQL-Snake
and P2P scans respectively[88].
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 describe the distribution of daily scan types during June 2002.
The indication of 60% of horizontal scans are from non-worm scans. It can be also
observed that surprisinply daily scans might be coordinated or arrive from distriduted
sources. Furthermore, it can be observed that port scans include ports in particular
11, 53 and web server ports such as 8000 and 8080. Although the common nature of
horizontal scans were vertical[88].
On figure 3.13, it can be observe the packets monitored per 5 minutes over 3 days.
The specific port was TCP 1023 which was Sasser.e operated. Two different telescopes
observed the active on /18 and /17 networks. It can be observed that there are large
short-lived spikes. Further from the research operated by Bailey and his colleagues
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Figure 3.12: Horizontal and vertical scans, of coordinated distribution for June 2002[88]
Figure 3.13: Sasser activity[3]
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found that there were no captured data on 9898/TCP and only two different signatures
on 5554/TCP and 1023/TCP. These signatures were observed through monitoring with
a network telescope worms such as Sasser, Sasser.e and Dabber.a[3].
Moore et al., also, observed that containment technologies can be used for effective
blocking of infectious communications. This allowed an additional time for reducing
the spread or even stop the infection. Furthermore, these mechanisms where the pri-
mary sources of protection through Code-Red attack or by isolation of infected hosts.
Unfortunately, these mechanisms were not able to stop completely or guarantee the
spread but provided a limited protection[65]. Furthermore, researchers rebuilt worm
signatures in order a network telescope database could easily recognize further phe-
nomena. Additionally, these fingerprints were saved with all the characteristics and
the ports of every worm, because worms have the characteristic that attack to certain
ports[81].
Chen et al., emphasized on collected traces for example in a /8 network which could
accurately emulate the hosts vulnerable distribution. The targeted addresses can be
used for the estimation of distributed victims in group i. Consequently, the probability
is: pg(i) =
number of addresses in group i
total number of collected addresses
[18].
Code Red I/II CodeRed was launched at July 13, 2001. It was exploiting a vulner-
ability of the Microsoft IIS Web servers. After compromising the server infected site
was defaced with the phrase “HELLO!Welcome to http://www.worm.com! Hacked By
Chinese!” and this typed only if the language were English. At the 1st and 20th of
each month it was spreading and at the 20th it was releasing an attack. The flood
attack was against the www.whitehouse.gov. White House changed the IP address and
this cause CodeRed to extinct for date up to the 20th. On the other hand, CodeRed II
launched on August 4, 2001. It was completely different code base than CodeRed. It
was creating a root backdoor and was programmed to crash NT working on Windows
2000. Furthermore, the code was preferring nearby addresses for propagating and it
was programmed to destroy CodeRed and safely extinct in Oct 1,2201[69].
Code-Red worm I was scanning for a vulnerability on the Windows Internet Informa-
tion Server with buffer overflow attack. It was named after all the pages infected and
the sites marked as “hacked by Chinese”. Code-Red I in its first operation searched
for vulnerable targets by the use of a IP generator. In its second operation at the
20-28 of every month stop propagation and loaded a DoS attack against the White
House governmental site[88]. On the other hand, Code-Red II was using the same
deficiencies as Code-Red, but it was completely different. Code-Red II had a propa-
gation mechanism generating addresses and masks whose size similarity is determined
from infected and probed hosts. It set up a root(administrative) backdoor and allowed
remote execution[88].
From July 4 up to Augusts 25, 2001, researchers tried to analyze successfully the spread
of the Code-Red worm. By using a network telescope they capture the traces of hosts
probing random addresses. It was easily observed because of the differences between
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Figure 3.14: CodeRed propagation in ten days[59, pp.5]
backscatter data and worm requests[65].
In few hours Code-Red worm infected more than 359,000 hosts of unique IP addresses.
The outcome of the research showed that the infection rate was approximately 2,000
host/minute[65] in only 10 hours. There was no effective patching mechanism and
there was a severe economic damage. Figure 3.14 shows the infection of CodeRed I
worm in ten days. As it is observed, there were severe attacks globally. CodeRed
was programmed on July 20 to deactivate and restart its operations on August 1.
Everybody knew through the media for the return and the only mechanism protecting
against was patching. Furthermore, the DHCP effect that CodeRed left was treated in
order to produce skewed statistics over a period.[59].
In order to classify the victims researchers searched for the reverse DNS records. The
outcome showed that only 22% of the hosts where identifiable. Broadband users and
dial-up where the major victims of Code-Red worm, but it was found that Code-Red
had a preferability to web servers. Additionally, 21% were home and small businnes
devices and only 13% of the DoS attack targets had this characteristic. The top most
infected domains were EDU, COM and NET[65].
In the case of CodeRed research it was observed that 47% of infected targets had
no DNS records. Therefore, the top level domains were impossible to be determined.
Domains like com, net, edu, mil and gov were infected. It was observed that 136
and 213 mil and gov hosts were infected respectively. Further, 390 private hosts were
infected raising the possibility that more private networks were influenced[56]. In the
case of CodeRed II the infection hosts remained the same and as it was monitored
observed that there was no significant change on the unsolicited packets[62].
Figure 3.15 describes the probe rate from every 2 hours on August 2-22 in a /8 network.
The spike on August 6 displays the backscatter flow from the DoS attack. Because of
no susceptible hosts in the /8 network the probe rate seemed the same as CodeRed.
Therefore, there was a difficulty examining infections, because could not easily distin-
guished from CodeRed[62].
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Table 3.4: Top Level Domains infected by CodeRed[62]
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Figure 3.15: The probe rate observed by a /8 network[62]
Table 3.4, describes the top level domains infected by CodeRed. It can be observed
that on July 19 .net, .com and .edu were mostly infected. Governmental infrastructures
were also infected[62].
Witty Witty worm was another destructive worm on March 19, 2004 observed by a
network telescope. It had a destructive payload and write 64k to disk randomly and
launched more than 100 hosts. Witty had the ability to infect security softwares and
spread quickly -even with small population infected- with approximately 12,000 hosts
at 45 minutes[59].
It was targeting Internet Security Systems of network security products. Additionally,
Witty was using a pseudo random generator and sent 20,000 copies of itself to different
destinations. Two telescopes monitored and captured the activity of Witty one in
CAIDA and one on University of Wisconsin. Network telescope help the researchers
to trace the propagation and also found the first infected hosts (or patient zero). They
could observe this phenomenon even when one packet arrived at the monitored space.
They could determine the seed of the pseudo random generator and could calculate the
random numbering system the target generated and how many packets sent by each
of these hosts. With knowledge of the packets sent researchers managed to observe
the propagation model of Witty worm. It was characteristic that CAIDA during the
75 minutes of propagation, the telescope congested from the packets since witty was
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Figure 3.16: Sapphire infection map[59]
using 95 Mbps from 100 Mbps in total. Furthermore, CAIDA telescope monitor more
packets than Wisconsin, because of the different connectivities. The patient zero (or
the first infected target) was not generating with the same patterns as the other infected
targets. Consequently, there is high possibility that this was the first machine used by
the adversary to launch an attack. Finally, researchers found the source of the Witty
attack and it was observed that the IP address corresponds to a European Internet
Service Provider’s host[34].
Furthermore, Witty was creating a bandwidth limitation and its payload was easily
to corrupt disk blocks. The flaw exploited by Witty was announced for patching the
previous day. The network telescope’s initial observations revealed that the spread
seeded by a list targeting a military base. The analysis also revealed that the first
infected host was European retail Internet Service Provider and witty worm was written
from a professional[69].
Casado et al., in their analysis for the Witty worm, found that 1 in every 256 pack-
ets observed sent by Witty infected host. The research was based on a /8 network.
Furthermore, it was observed that Witty was using a pseudo random generator using
linear congruential number generator. Additionally, it was observed that by examin-
ing the packets sent by Witty infected hosts, the randomness becomes deterministic
and predictable. This determinism offers the ability to predict the packets sent to the
network telescope and offers the possibility to compute the bandwidth of the local link
with accuracy[14].
Sapphire or SQL-Slammer and SQL-Snake In the case of Sapphire(or SQL
Slammer) was monitored that 100,000 hosts infected in only 10 minutes and observed
that more than 55 million probes send per second globally. There were severe damages
to the Bank of America ATMs and in Airlines. From figure 3.16 it can be observed the
severity monitored by a network telescope in Jan 24, 2003[59].
Slammer worm exploited UDP services and entire worm could fit in a single packet.
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Additionally, the worm infected more than 75,000 in 10 minutes and at its peak dou-
ble its propagation[69]. When it begun spreading in ten minutes more than 90% of
vulnerable targets were infected causing severe damages to the financial systems, trans-
portation and institutions. Slammer began its spreading on January 25, 2003 and was
exploiting a buffer-overflow to Microsoft SQL-Server. It was considered as a high-speed
propagating worm comparing to other malwares such as CodeRed. It was overloading
the network and it had effectiveness by disabling the database servers. Furthermore,
there were many backbone internet distruptions[58].
On the other hand, SQL-Snake was detected also on May 2002. The scanning model
was allocated for MS-SQL running on port 1433 and to hosts with default accounts such
as admin and started random scanning to all address ranges[88]. From the analysis of
Bakos et al., it was observed that SQL-Snake was based on an old vulnerability on SQL
Server and combined with few features. The worm had the ability to execute ActiveX
object commands via SQL Server and passed to non-password protected administration
account[7].
Blaster and Sorbig On August 11, 2003 Blaster worm appeared. Blaster had the
ability to scan addresses of a /24 from 0-254 and scan a network for port 135 TCP,
listening on port 69 UDP and there was an attempt to connect when the vulnerability
found. Then connected to port 4444 of TCP and download a certain file for execution.
Unfortunately, Blaster was not easily detectable. No response to 135/TCP SYN and
there was no active sampling and no 4444/TCP flow[66].
It was exploiting security flaws on Windows Remote Procedure Call(RPC) by copying
an exploit and add that within the initial code. After that, a DoS attack was launched
to windowsupdate.com. Within one week 100,000 Windows hosts infected and after
a year it was steal active. Researchers in order to measure Blaster activity used a /8
network. This sensor was under the use of the Internet Monitor Sensor. Furthermore,
prefiltering of the packets eliminated false positives as it was observed. Additionally,
Blaster was an example of the lifecycle observed which all phases included such as
latency, growth,delay and persistence. In the latency phase it was observed high activ-
ity of scanning on TCP port 135 correlating exploits from individuals or groups. The
growth phase was followed by decay were effective patching and removal was efficient.
Also, it was observed that after efficient treatment, the phenomenon of Blaster start
diminishing. Finally, it was monitored that the persistent phase were small from the
remaining infections[6].
After one year of the release Blaster was observed that the persistent phase was not
diminished. In August 2004, it was discovered that more than 200,000 addresses moni-
tored were scanning the darknet. Further to the research found that 90,000 IP addresses
were under infection. The phenomenon of persistence was not new, but the infection
of Blaster was interesting. Additionally, Microsoft released a tool to remove the worm
executable and then patch the system. Unfortunately, six months later the same year
was observed that the infected population still was large. Figure 3.17, describes the
Blaster lifecyle. Anyone, can observe the four phases: latency, growth, decay, persistent
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Figure 3.17: Blaster Life Cycle[6]
phase[6].
According to observations and analysis of Dubendorfe, Blaster had an outbreak on
August 11, 2003. There were many infected hosts, approximately 200,00 Internet
storm centers and 8 million hosts. Blaster was exploiting the remote procedure call
which was a buffer overflow in Windows systems on port 135/TCP and it launched a
DDoS attack against windowsupdate.com. It was observed that through the infection
stage there were no response from target at 135/TCP and even if there was response
port 135 was closed. The target were downloading the executable exploit but not the
worm code[27].
On the other hand, Sobig.F had an outbreak on August 13, 2003. The worm was
attached to the e-mail. The interesting point for Sorbig was that used its own SMTP
engine to spread. Figure 3.18 describes the flow of the Sorbig worm. It can be observed
an increase over 5 in e-mail traffic, during the outbreak, as it was monitored. Further-
more, 140,000 e-mails/hour were transmitted during the outbreak of Sorbig[27].
Nimda Nimda released on Sept 18, 2001. Had a multi-mode spreading and was
attacking via e-mail and address books to IIS servers. It was sending copies across
networks and was modifying sites and scanning for CodeRed II vulnerabilities or back-
doors left[69]. Nimda worm, had a targeted detection that is not well researched, but
follows approximately the model of 50% addresses with same 2 octets, 25% match with
the first octet and 25% is randomly selected. Figure 3.19, describes the source scan-
54
Figure 3.18: Sorbig flow analyis[27]
Figure 3.19: May-July 2002, Daily scans on port 80[88]
nings of port 80 in 2002. It can be observed the nature of port 80 scans. The drop
in 19th of every month confirms the liveliness of Code-Red I. Also, it can be observed
that vulnerable targets reinfected and start producing slowly at 1-7 days[88].
Another characteristic of worms is the persistent attacks. Through a research con-
ducted by Yegneswaran et al. in a 3 month period on port 80 in /24 and /32, found
that CodeRed II and Nimda had the affinity toward local victims[88]. On the other
hand, Song et al. observed in a seven week period in 2001 with their network tele-
scope 2,500,365,946 TCP SYN packets to nonexistent servers. The peak rate was
2000 hits/second. From the analysis of 16,433 hits was observed 5 fingerprints of
worms. From table 3.5 can be examined that worms monitored are CodeRed I/II/.D
and Nimda/.e. From the requests of signatures for each worm monitored Nimda had
higher hits, because of the CodeRed’s periodicity or timely death[82].
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Table 3.5: Infection Attempts at 1 over 100,000 sampling through network telescope[82]
Worm Propagation
In section 3.3 it is described how worms monitored through a network telescope. Dis-
cussion on various worms will be conducted through the network telescope point of
view. In this section, it will be provided the most important epidemic model that
can be used to examine the worm propagation and examination of worm propagation
models will be used for network telescopes.
Traditional epidemiology commends that important for the propagation of a worm
are the vulnerabilities of the certain population. Meaning the period and the rate of
the infection. Additionally, there are three interfering phases of a worm: prevention,
treatment and containment[65]. On the other hand, Yegneswaran et al. in order to
categorize the propagation of worms divided scans into four categories. The vertical
scan is the sequential or randomly scanning on multiple ports on an address during an
hour. The horizontal scan is the scanning efficiency of a source combining the power of
several machines in a network targeting the same port and the same vulnerability. The
coordinated scanning(or distributed scanning), is scanning from many sources aiming
a specific port on specific destinations in a certain /x subnet within an hour period.
The stealth scanning is horizontal or vertical scanning in a frequency low enough to
avoid detection[88].
In the case of a well designed propagation mechanism was observed that the initial
acceleration with hit-lists of % vulnerable network hosts at 100 scans/second could be
a vast infected population in just minutes. On the other hand, Staniford observed that
with a hit-list of vulneranle hosts and propagation model well designed could propagate
at 106 hosts in less than 2 seconds[69]. There is an observation though that worms
prefer propagation through nearby addresses. Therefore, it can be effectively spread
and increase speed due to local hosts and distances. Furthermore, hit-lists helps the
propagation strategy through firewalls and security as it is observed through network
telescope sensors. Thus, it is preferable to place network telescopes to nearby locations
for effective monitoring and measurement of network activity[20].
From the monitoring of CodeRed was observed that in approximately a day propa-
gated through 359,000 unique addresses. A further analysis showed that CodeRed was
exponentially spreading and at its peak rate of infection, 2,000 hosts/minute were in-
fected. Through the research, it was observed that 55% of the reverse DNS records
didn’t existed to the infected hosts and 22% only were manageable of identification[65].
Paxson on the other hand, through a network telescope, estimated that the number of
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Figure 3.20: Growth of Witty worm[59]
infected hosts from the propagation of CodeRed was 360k[69].
In the case of Sapphire approximately 100,000 hosts in ten minutes successfully infected.
On the other hand, the most destructive Internet worm so far was the Witty. It was the
first one with destructive payload and was successfully wrote 64k blocks to the disk.
The zero-patients or the first infected hosts were more than 100. The propagation
even if the population used was small succeeded to be approximately 12,000 hosts in
45 minutes when reached the highest limit of infection. From figure 3.20, it can be
observed that the propagation model was extremely fast. In only the first 10 seconds
110 hosts were infected[59].
Furthermore, Sapphire/Slammer worm behaved in the first 60 seconds as classic worm
activity, but doubled its propagation approximately in every 8.5 seconds instead of
CodeRed which doubled every 40 minutes. Additionally, it was observed that in more
than a minute started to overload the bandwidth and started scanning more than 20,000
hosts/second. Also, it reached its peak at approximately 3 minutes and 55 million
scans/second. Further, to the research and monitoring through a network telescope was
observed that in less than 10 minutes 90% of the internet already scanned. Moreover,
through figure 3.16 can be observed the infection rate. Actually, 100,000 hosts infected
in ten minutes and reported a probing rate of 55 million per second[56].
Moore et al. monitored that more than 90% of infected hosts were infected in 10 min-
utes. By exploiting the vulnerabilty of SQL-Server, the worm infected approximately
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Figure 3.21: DShield project monitoring a random scanning worm[58]
75,000 hosts and caused severe problems especially to ATM machines. Its propagation
model can be characterized as unique, because in 3 minutes approximately achieved
its peak rate and the considerable amount of 55 million scans/second monitored. The
worm propagation model of Slammer resided on randomly scanning. Through this
characteristic the random scanning worms have the ability to propagate exponen-
tially, but new infections slow the continuity of the worm, because Slammer retried
infections[58].
Figure 3.21, describes the Distributed Intrusion Detection System data sets in com-
parison with a random constant spread model. As it can be observed the band-
width overload and failures in networks produced changes to the growth rate of the
probe[58].
Nazario, on his research for Blaster, in order to detect its propagation start detecting
first port 135 of TCP scans. The network telescope used for this propagation modeling
was a /24 network[66]. Furthermore, Cooke et al. on their research in order to test the
propagation hypothesis of the Blaster worm isolated the signature. Blaster as a worm
had simple propagation model based on sequential scans. The first step observed for
Blaster was that choose local addresses on a /16 as source 40% and randomly selections
60% of the time. Then the propagation strategy was to scan sequentially with 20
attempts at a time. In figure 3.22, it can be observed the propagation attempts as
monitored by a /24 network. Furthermore, differences in sensors can also be examined.
There is a significant change in sources. However, spikes in I/17 conclude to that might
be hotspots which cannot be correlated in the overall traffic[20].
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Figure 3.22: Blaster infection attempts recorde by a /24 and /16 network[20]
In addition, it was monitored that within a week Blaster infected more than 100,000
Microsoft Windows systems. The propagation strategy had a preference on local /16
network addresses. Furthermore, it was observed that the propagation model when
was installed to a host was scanning for infection 20 sequential addresses on port
135/TCP. The propagation model of Blaster observed by a /8 unused space(network
telescope) which represents roughly the 1/256 of the Internet addresses. Also, was
observed that scanning from Blaster were 4-10 and increased at the day of patching
mechanisms released at 100-300 per day. Additionally, was monitored that in the first
few hours of propagation Blaster had been propagated exponentially and doubled in
approximately 9 minutes. Also, Blaster examined through the network telescope and
observed that 15,000 addresses in an hour and 106,000 addresses in 24 hours has been
scanned. Further to the research of Blaster, the observations after one year on Blaster’s
release, showed that still was active. The network telescope monitored that the peak
was 4,100 addresses per day[6].
Worm Propagation Modelling The SI epidemic model illustrates the growth of
infectious pathogen propagating through similar random contacts between Susceptible
and Infected hosts. Therefore, worms can be well described through this model. The
description of infected hosts proportional at time t is: i(t) = e
β(t−T )
1+eβ(t−T ) . This equation
is well known and is applied by the health service to digital pathogens. In order this
formula to be arranged base to worms, variables changed their meanings. Population
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N is the Internet vulnerable hosts for exploitation. The S(t), susceptibles are the
vulnerable hosts, but not yet exploited. I(t), is the infective; hosts that help with the
propagation of the worm. β is the function of probing rate r and the algorithm in use
for selecting new targets[65].
This formula, has the characteristic that small values of t helps the phenomenon to
grow exponentially up to the point of vast infection and then the phenomenon slows
exponentially up to zero as infections are completed. Moore et al., on the other hand,
assumes that hosts infected were chosen randomly such as CodeRed worms. Therefore,
β = r N
232
because probing will reach with probability N
232
a vulnerable device. Hence,
if β is fixed, N,r are inversely proportional. Furthermore, propagation of a worm in N
population of hosts vulnerable to worm attacks at rate r is equal to the propagation
of N devices probing at fracra rate[65].
Staniford, in order to explain the propagating model of CodeRed, used the epidemic
model. In the epidemiological model there are two states. The Susceptible host,
is infected from other infectees while can recover and become Susceptible. There-
fore, the epidemiological model is using the susceptible→ infected→ susceptible or SIS
model. In order to describe the SIS model, the use of nonlinear differential equation
for the measurement of infected population is: dn
dt
= βn(1 − n) − dn, where n(t) is
a fraction of infectees from the vulnerable hosts. β, is the rate in which infectees
infect susceptibles and d is when infectee becomes susceptible. Hence, the equation
is: n(t) = n0(1−p)
n0+(1−p−n0)e−(β−d)t , where p and n0 are p =
d
β
, n0 = n(t = 0). Concerning
random propagation models the rate β becomes sN
232
, where N is the vulnerable hosts
total number and s the scanning rate[16].
On the other hand the AAWP or Analytical Worm Propagation model, proposed by
Chen and his colleagues, has the ability to model propagation of active worms of
random scanning. This is a nonlinear difference equation model: ni+1 = (1 − d)ni +
(N − ni)[1− (1− 1232 )sni ]. ni, is the expectation of the infectees at time i. The AAWP
model considers time that a worm occupies to infect a certain host[16].
Cooke et al., in their research for propagation, tried to observe and characterize
the botnet propagation. They tracked the propagation activity of bots. Also, they
observed the scanning mechanism for backdoors left and vulnerabilities. Through
this, it was examined the Internet Monitor Sensor and observed the activity of the
backdoors[21].
On the other hand, Rajab et al. used another method for effective modeling and
monitoring a worm. Their methodology has two invariant behavioral properties, (i)
the spread by active scans on a certain address range searching for probable infectees
and that the worm follows the pathogenic model of propagation in a fixed population.
With these invariants they estimated the worm evolution and identify the first infectee,
by monitoring the scan ordering and arrival times from consecutive scans arriving at
the blackhole monitoring system[73].
In order to evaluate the accuracy of a telescope to monitor the sequence, they distin-
guished between the average time of infection and the time of detection by a network
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telescope of a new infectee and denoted as Tin and Td respectively. Hence, they also
included the possibility that a newly infected host will send a packet to the telescope
before the additional infectees[73].
Furthermore, they considered the uniformity of worm scanning propagation with s
host/scanning rate over vulnerable V population. Additionally, by the use of discrete
time model and the model of Chen et al. concluded that ni the infectees number at
the i -th step is:
ni = ni−1 + (V − ni−1[1− (1− 1
232
)R]) (3.1)
R, is the number of scans in totally by ni−1 infectees. The right part of equation 3.1
is the increase of infectees. Furthermore, in order to calculate time Tin, there is a
necessity for one more infectee to be set one. Therefore, the second equation is:
(V − ni−1)[1− (1− 1
232
)Tinsni−1 ] = 1 (3.2)
[73]
Therefore, by solving for Tin is:
Tin =
log(1− 1
V−ni−1 )
sni−1 log(1− 1232 )
(3.3)
Furthermore, in order to compute the α probability that one scan will reach the tele-
scope at least is:
α = 1− (1− M
232
)RT (3.4)
[73]
Additionally, by solving for RT , from equation 3.4 is:
RT =
log(1− α)
log(1− M
232
)
(3.5)
Thus, Td =
RT
s
where s is the average rate of scanning[73].
Moore et al., in their initial research for the completion of a network telescope referred
that a network telescope even if it depends on the proper analysis of single hosts events
there must be also proper analysis for the pandemic incidents, because affect a large
population[64].
Figures 3.23 and 3.24, describe the effect observed by a network telescope of host
infection from a random propagating worm. Actually, it is compared the observed
infections in a /8 and /16 telescope by simulation method. It was monitored 360,000
vulnerable hosts with 10 scans/sec from a CodeRed similar worm. The /8 curve on
top of the actual curve and the /16 is distorted because of the logarithmic spread of
the random worm propagation[64].
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Figure 3.23: Logarithmic Infection[64]
Figure 3.24: Linear Infection[64]
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Firstly, it is examined the start and end precision times. The same principle as sin-
gle host events lies here, even if if is not possible to measure exactly the precision
times. However, time distributions and confidences can be used in order to deter-
mine time ranges for high probability of start and end times. For uniform incidents
with respect to rates and times the calculation is fairly easy. The first probability
distribution of the packet received from a certain event is the probability of the event.
The same lies for the end for an incident. Furthermore, because incidents vary with
rates diversity is considered to be caused by the characteristics or host specific incident
characteristics[64].
In the case of random propagation worms, propagation can be computed through the
epidemic SI model. Therefore, the equation for infectees at t time is:
I(t) = N
eβ(t−T )
1 + eβ(t− T ) (3.6)
where T, is the constant integration of fixing time where half of the infectee population
exists. Additionally, β which is the contact rate is the function of r scan rate of the
worm over the targeting propagation algorithm. Hence, in 32-bit address the rate will
be β = r N
232
, because the scan will contact the vulnerable host with N
232
probability.
Further, there are two approaches for tracking packets: count the packets arriving at
specific times and the infectees addresses[64].
Additionally, the epidemic model insists that a host will continually be infected if only
once infected. Also, the total infectees in time (tα ≤ t ≤ tb), is the I(tb) infected at
end. However, the scan number in total in a time is the sum of scans sent by each
infectee at each time:
scans(ta, tb) =
∫ tb
ta
rI(t)dt =
rN
β
ln
(
1 + eβ(tb−T )
1 + eβ(ta−T )
)
(3.7)
Therefore,with a network telescope, equation 3.7 must be modified for proper scaling
of the scan number arriving in /x network:
telescopescans(ta, tb, p) = p · scans(ta, tb) =
=
prN
β
ln
(
1 + eβ(tb−T )
1 + eβ(ta−T )
)
= 232p ln
(
1 + eβ(tb−T )
1 + eβ(ta−T )
)
(3.8)
[64]
Therefore, equations 3.6 and 3.8 are used for the effective data counts. So, I(t) and
ti−1, ti are used for scan counts. Recalling the β rate, scans ti−1, ti occur when r,N are
together as a pair. Therefore, scan data by themselves do not provide useful information
for the rates r,N [64].
Furthermore, Moore et al. correct the distortions from propagations which is used
from the continuous SI model and describe the actual size of infectees at I(t) time.
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Consequently, the expectation for observations with a telescope counting hosts is:
O′(t) =
∫ t
−∞
I ′(t− x)Prob [delay = x] dx (3.9)
and because geometric distribution is needed, they compute I(t) from equation 3.9:
I ′(t) =
∫ ∞
t
O′(x)Prob[delay = x− t]dx (3.10)
[64]
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, in depth analysis of pandemic and endemic incidents through the func-
tionality of network telescopes were examined. In DoS section was examined the way
that these phenomena send unsolicited packets through a network. Further, descrip-
tion of unsolicited traffic and characterization of backscatter packets through different
ways conducted. Also, this chapter examined backscatter models and how endemic
incidents monitored from network telescopes.
Moreover, pandemic incidents were analyzed such as CodeRed I/II, Blaster, Witty,
Slammer and SQL-Snake. Characteristics of each pandemic incident described and
observe its propagation models. Additionally, the propagation models examined and
how can be used for monitoring techniques.
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Chapter 4
Topologies
4.1 Introduction
On previous chapters there was a discussion on various ways to monitor pandemic
and endemic incidents. There was a reference to various mathematical tools and how
researchers categorized pandemic and endemic incidents. Furthermore, there was an
examination on various worms and detection methodologies and how these methodolo-
gies could be used for detection techniques on a network telescope. On this chapter
there will be a discussion on various topologies implemented or existed for research
purposes. Moreover, an analysis on various types of architectures such as passive and
active telescopes will be conducted. Moreover, there will be analysis on the topologies
on itself and not for the features that a certain topology used for effective reasons.
Meaning that there will not be an analysis on virtual machines or gateway routers that
these topologies use.
Furthermore, architectures will be analyzed. In case that whoever needs further infor-
mation about containment technologies, virtual machines or gateway protocols, please
refer to the research done and the documentation gathered. In addition, full analysis
from the inventors and the implementers of these telescopes will be discussed. Addi-
tionally, there will be an analysis on how the researchers built the topology and what
features they used.
4.2 Passive
One of the uses of a network telescope is passive monitoring. Through passive moni-
toring, a telescope can observe the packets and keep logs and discard them, but with-
out interacting with the attacker[34, 77]. On the other hand, passive telescopes are
useful for measuring the attack behavior especially for pandemic incidents such as
worms[88].
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Figure 4.1: Passive telescope topology[61]
A passive network telescope records the observed packets and takes no further actions.
By this interaction, network telescope will have the opportunity to observe hosts and
packet information. However, information about attack or misconfiguration might not
be revealed. For instance, if a network telescope will observe the three TCP handshake
will not monitor it. It will monitor the handshake as an attempt for connection with
the use of TCP[52].
In passive network telescopes, the headers and payloads received are analyzed oﬄine
for characterization of malicious traffic. Passive telescope characterizes traffic basis to
protocol, number and sources type. Type, number of destinations and ports attacked
through a period. Also, it can detect pandemic and endemic incidents such as worm
payloads and backscatter data. Unfortunately, a passive telescope cannot identify
attacks for instance exchange packets before malicious activity. Furthermore, it cannot
detect activity if attacker or attackers disconnect or discard the attack quickly[34].
Furthermore, a passive telescope must be able to monitor packet information with high
accuracy. Tools used or methods for packet capturing must be flexible and efficient in
order the data to be monitored and logged properly[93]. For instance, one of the net-
work telescope’s implementations used by Sandvine to monitor real traffic and observe
a DDoS attack[76].
Figure 4.1 is an experimental platform used for DoS analysis. The network was utilized
/8 and consisted of a host monitoring ethernet traffic and was placed after a router
where the network terminated. Furthermore, it must be mentioned that the router was
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Table 4.1: Backscatter Database observed by passive topology[61]
filtering the traffic, but it did not had any impact on the data received. Additionally,
with this simple architecture researchers collected data for backscatter analysis over
a three year period. Furthermore, table 4.1 is a characteristic example of passive
monitoring database which is a summary of traces and attacks observed. There were
observed 68,700 attacks in 34,700 addresses over 5,300 DNS domains[61].
4.3 Active
An active telescope responds to incoming packets and tries to establish communication
with the attacker. In the case of an Internet worm, a network telescope will continuously
communicate with more than 10 messages, sometimes, until the worm is identified.
Active monitoring is reliably distinguish attacks and can emulate a service and analyze
attacks. Furthermore, it can keep tracks of the attacker and offers scalability. On
the other hand, it can be resource-intensive and must be decided by the architect the
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responder’s type. A stateful responder will keep each connection’s state if it is active.
Stateless responder will design an application response based on previous packets.
Furthermore, filtering might be needed for effective monitoring of the traffic[34].
Active telescopes response to arriving packets and by this methodology information
about application, exploit, attempt and attacker intensions can be collected. A re-
sponse, for instance, can be a TCP SYN/ACK to a SYN packet. By this way complex
attempts such as pandemic incidents can be categorized effectively. Furthermore, be-
cause of limited information more responses might be needed to resolve the attempt.
Therefore, in order to collect more data creation of an emulated host can be realized.
By the use of an emulated host observance of more data can be succeeded, since the
active telescope has the ability to emulate an application or maybe a service. On the
other hand, the emulated host can be identified and the attacker to avoid the unused
space. Hence, the solution to this problem can be given by a host running real services
and applications if needed such as a Honeypot. The honeypot will provide more infor-
mation about a certain activity and will profile behaviors, intensions and purpose of
the attempt. The simplest method for this service, is to install virtual machines on a
real host[52].
In the case of iSink design, active response had the feature to gather information that is
detailed from abusive traffic. This feature was applied by generating transport and ap-
plication packets to the intrusion activity. Furthermore, few active telescopes have the
ability for tarpitting in order to beneficially interfere with malicious activity[93].
On the other hand, Song et al. in order to measure the activity of a DDoS phenomenon
used an active telescope and intrusion detection techniques offering a finer-grained
traffic monitoring. Their information from a network telescope consisted of packet
from application, traffic levels and worm fingerprints. The results of their monitoring
can be observed from table 3.5[82].
4.4 Distributed Network Telescope
A distributed network telescope is the combination of telescopes for the purpose of
monitoring different ranges of addresses into a large one. Can take the form of contigu-
ous ranges such as a heterogeneous distributed system or an area of P2P networks[64].
Distributed telescopes belong to passive monitoring systems which are useful for mea-
suring, especially, Internet pandemic incidents. For instance, from figures 4.2 and 4.3
it can be examined the daily observations from a Class B telescope. These observations
made basis to scan rates for non-worm and 80/TCP port scans. On figure 4.2 can be
observed that traffic has spatial components and can be monitored from a distributed
set of telescopes. However, for figure 4.3 even a /16 network telescope can observe
effectively the traffic and scan activity[88].
One of the distributed systems used today is the IMS. The Internet Motion Sensor
has the ability to detect from distributed networks of /24 nets around the global
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Figure 4.2: Daily rates of scans observed by a /16 telescope[88]
Figure 4.3: Daily rates from 80/TCP observed by /16 telescope[88]
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Figure 4.4: IMS[20]
network[38]. Consists of 60 network telescopes from 18 organizations, enterprises and
networks from academia in 3 continents world wide. Furthermore, observes approxi-
mately over 17 million addresses[52]. Moreover, it was observed that an IMS sensor
had a rate of 9 packets/second over 2.5 years. Additionally, it was observed that the
lowest rate was 0.6 packets/second and the highest daily was 290 packets/second. Fur-
thermore, the bandwidth that a sensor such as IMS is using is 7 Kbps for a /24 sensor,
60Kbps for a /16 sensor and for an /8 sensor 40 Mbps[52].
IMS was designed for interaction across all the network telescopes. Furthermore, it was
chosen for interactivity and to differentiate and characterize the traffic. Additionally,
it can provide a wide visibility for Internet incidents. As it can be observed from figure
4.4, IMS is consisted from various sensors and aggregators. Therefore, IMS sensors can
be categorized to blackhole and topology monitors. The blackhole collects data from
threats and topology monitors provide the appropriate information[20].
The blackhole sensors work on both active and passive state. Furthermore, the data
storage of the IMS helps with the analysis and collection of various packet information.
It supports real time trending and data analysis for processing, and because of the
large amount of data gathered it can be an inefficient analysis. Therefore, for this
purpose each sensor gathers the information needed and performs further processes
and trigger alerts when is needed. Moreover, for efficiency reasons a sensor stores the
MD5 checksum and compares it with the data arriving. When a new hash checksum
is observed it is stored for future comparisons. From table 4.2, different deployments
of the Internet Monitor Sensor can be observed. These deployments are representative
sample of all /8 addresses. Furthermore, these sensors can help both comparison of
data analysis through the Internet[20].
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Table 4.2: IMS deployments[20]
However, Sandin proposed that in a distributed system making use of Intrusion De-
tection Systems and use of Honeypots could be beneficial, referred in his research for
effective measurement methods on peer-to-peer systems. Also, referred to Chord et al.
who proposed that efficient routing in the case of faults and hosts might be possible.
Furthermore, Sandin proposed that fault tolerant aggregation algorithms are efficient
for the reliability of the sensors[75].
On the other hand, Bailey et al. proposed a hybrid model for distributed monitoring.
As it can be examined from figure 4.5, the hybrid architecture consists from an IMS
and a Host Motion Sensor(HMS). The IMS will be monitoring the range of addresses
and the activity will be proxied to the HMS for in depth analysis of the incidents.
Furthermore, in oder to avoid false positives and scaling issues combination with a pre-
filtering installation could be examined. Additionally, the HMS can provide a forensic
analysis depending on the data. It consists of a host resource, virtual machine and a
detection module[5].
Zou et al., on the other hand proposed another system for monitoring , the Malware
Warning Center (MWC) which is based on the distributed topology. As it is observed
from figure 4.6, the distributed system is using two monitors for effectiveness. The
ingress monitors can be placed on routers locally or on passive topologies for logging
traffic. On the other hand, egress monitor is used for monitoring outgoing traffic in
order to infer potential behavior from worms. For ingress monitor it is really difficult
to monitor properly global incidents, but for egress monitors is effective because of the
scans sent outside the network by infectees. Furthermore, for effective analysis of a
pandemic incident the distributed sensors must send continuously observations to the
Malware Warning Center. Therefore, in order to avoid congestion of Internet activity
data mixers are used. Data mixers, are installed between the Center and the monitors.
Mixers after fusing(e.g. removal of unnecessary addresses from infected hosts) the data,
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Figure 4.5: Hybrid Architecture[5]
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Figure 4.6: Malware Warning Center[95]
pass the information to the MWC[95].
4.5 Anycast Network Telescope
Anycast network telescopes are using multiple locations for the proper advertisement
of routes at the same /x network. A telescope of this category does not monitor
large ranges such as a distributed monitor, but share some of the advantages and
disadvantages. By advertising many locations of /x prefixes, the telescope provides
availability for monitoring effectively the traffic flow of events. Furthermore, this event
traffic flow will be smaller because of the hosts’ locations and telescope monitors in a
/x network. Therefore, a telescope of this category will distribute the flow and load
over many sites and the traffic event flow will be observed faster than the other models
of telescopes[64].
Figure 4.7 describes the anycast topology of a network telescope. An anycast tele-
scope, basis to McPherson et al., allows the garbage of packets, effective distribution
and management. Furthermore, anycast is a technique which is used effectively over
DNS services, distributed telescopes, telescope routers for IP management and routing
reasons. Additionally, an anycast telescope needs two different IPs. One for effective
management and the other IP for anycasting. Moreover, because darknets are used to
attract attacks, a proper placement in a network is required with proper integration
and must have small impact on performance and availability of a network[53].
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Figure 4.7: Anycast Topology[53]
4.6 Transit Network Telescope
Unfortunately, this category results found were only from Moore et al. from their
technical report for network telescopes. They described that a transit network telescope
monitors IP ranges, but from within the transit network and not from the edges of
/x network. It observes large ranges of addresses and manages to monitor centrally
and do not have synchronization and distribution problems. Furthermore, a telescope
of this category can only monitor effectively IPs from the same network. Moreover,
characterizing accurately events is not efficient with a transit telescope. Therefore,
a transit telescope is efficient for the detection of occurrence of events, but cannot
characterize properly in details. For instance, cannot describe the headers of the packets
in detail such as a distributed system[64].
4.7 Honeyfarm
A honeyfarm network telescope belongs to the active topologies of telescopes. It ac-
tively responds to traffic basis to its features. Furthermore, it must be decided by
researchers/administrators of the network the range of monitoring addresses. Addition-
ally, for utility reasons a honeyfarm must observe high rates of traffic in order to avoid
any correlation with the background flow. Moreover, the active responses can overload
a network and a special consideration is needed when a honeyfarm operates[64].
On the other hand, a honeypot can run daemons or services that a sensor such as
74
a network telescope can monitor. It can observe the activity and indicate infections.
With the use of a honeypot, fault tolerance can also be checked. Furthermore, honeypot
can be used with telescopes and monitor traffic and track configuration mistakes. The
high tolerance offered by this model creates an ideal infrastructure[75].
A honeynet is a high interaction honeypot build to monitor information about secu-
rity threats. Provides systems, applications, services that are real for interaction and
provides emulation of certain operating systems and daemons(services). Furthermore,
it can be considered a network of real hosts. The victims within this system can be
resources of any type. In particular, can be an internet site, Solaris servers and even
VAX systems. Honeynets, on the other hand, are not production systems. Hence, in-
teraction with these machines implies malicious activity. The architecture of honeynet
implies , also, a highly controllable network, because monitoring and control operations
are efficient[70].
Figure 4.8, describes the architecture of the Honeynet. The honeywall gateway which
is the key for the effective architecture separates the network and the honeypots, but
it is invisible to an attacker. The key requirements for a honeywall are: Data Control,
Data Capture, Data Analysis and Data Collection. The Data Control, defines the
activity ratio which will be processed to the honeynet without the knowledge of the
attacker. The Data Capture will capture the activity. Data Analysis is the ability
of the system to analyze data for further results. Data Collection has the ability to
collect information about activities from multiple sources or honeynets to a certain
source. Data Control has the ability to mitigate properly the risk[70].
A Honeyfarm is a collection of honeypots monitored by a network telescope. Further-
more, it was observed that any outgoing traffic from a honeyfarm will be an activity
from a pandemic incident. Additionally, it was examined that will be efficient if signa-
tures observed from inbound and outbound traffic can be stored. Moreover, researchers
by examining that the telescope’s range is N addresses then there is an expectancy for
proper detection after 1
N
infected population[69].
Furthermore, one of the implementations of a honeyfarm is the HoneyTank project.
HoneyTank, is a workstation accepting TCP traffic arriving from blackholes and replies
through emulated services. Moreover, its features provides advantages such as simul-
taneous connections and characterization of vast amounts of data[87].
Figure 4.9 describes the architectural model of Collapsar which follows the Honeyfarm
category. There is a number of high-interaction and virtual honeypots and are located
in a local network. The honeypots in Collapsar are easily configured, monitored and
are manageable. The end-systems or the routers used by Collapsar redirect the network
flow to the Collapsar Center. Furthermore, it was observed that end-systems provide
an additional delay to the packets arriving and routers require high manageability.
Additionally, Collapsar has the ability to detect and stop propagation or backscatter
phenomena[43].
Furthermore, Potemkin is a honeyfarm based on network gateway and a virtual machine
monitoring the flow of network. Figure 4.10, describes a honeyfarm architecture. The
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Figure 4.8: Honeynet architecture[70]
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Figure 4.9: Collapsar architecture[43]
gateway redirects the packets to the servers and the honeyfarm servers create virtual
machines for further interactions. The outbound traffic is under the control of the
gateway containment policy[89].
Potemkin Honeyfarm, it is based on scalability and containment technologies. For scal-
ability reasons, in order to avoid deficiencies, Potenkin stresses the latency of resources
to requests. While packets arriving, a router binds the addresses to the honeyfarm
servers for interaction. For the interaction process, the servers create virtual machines
by creating the illusion of attached hosts. Moreover, for containment purposes, Vrable
et al. implement containment policy to the router(gateway router). Therefore, the
gateway must be able to track the communication between the IP addresses and the
virtual machine created to the honeyfarm servers. Moreover, the gateway must proxy
the outbound requests. Furthermore, the virtual machine monitor creates virtual ma-
chine for each distinct address which scans the darknet. By this measurement isolation
is successful, but proper installment is needed or else it can be very costly[89].
4.8 Greynets
Harrop et al., proposed another topology for a network telescope. A greynet is consist-
ing of unused IPs and assigned ones. The network is sparsely populated with unused
IPs and interspersing active addresses for effective traffic monitoring. The active IPs
are assigned to hosts on the network. By interspersing unused IPs among active ones
there is higher probability for the network telescope to observe a phenomenon such as
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Figure 4.10: HoneyFarm Architecture[89]
malware attack[38].
4.9 Summary
On this chapter examination on various topologies of network telescopes conducted.
There was an analysis on passive and active architectures and what features it can be
used for effective monitoring. It was observed that passive topologies do not interfere
with the traffic flow and just monitor for incidents and categorize them basis to the
packet information. On the other hand, active topologies have the characteristic to
reply on various incidents and track the user. In conclusion, there was also an analysis
for greynets which is a combination of darknet and active IPs.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation and Analysis
5.1 Introduction
The last part is the evaluation of network telescopes. Through this chapter there will be
a discussion and analysis on the effectiveness of network telescopes. It will be analyzed
the advantages and the disadvantages of network telescopes and the deficiencies ob-
served through various experiments. Furthermore, there will be an opportunity for the
reader to understand the theoretical part and thoughts of the researchers and how they
concluded to various topologies and various algorithms for effective monitoring.
5.2 Effectiveness of Network Telescopes
A network telescope consists of unused addresses and no legitimate traffic exists in the
monitored space. Therefore, since no legitimate traffic exists in a network telescope
monitoring space, results from activity must be misconfiguration, backscatter activity,
worm propagation or other type of network probing[52].
Network telescopes are effective in seeing large explosions of events and its effective-
ness depends on proper statistical and mathematical tools[56]. Furthermore, Bailey et
al. observed that small darknets sometimes can receive more packets/day than mon-
itors which observe large IP ranges[52]. Moore et al., added that a telescope’s size is
proportional to the size of the space monitored. Therefore, short and low intensity at-
tacks generate less packets and thus the need for large monitoring space is required to
resolve the information of the activity[61]. Furthermore, it was observed that the ad-
dresses generating data for the network telescope had differences in magnitude. Hence,
there must be a mechanism in order to check if the data are manageable and can be
generalized[20]. Additionally to what Moore and colleagues examined, it was observed
that a /24 has a rate of 9 packets/second, a /16 75 packets/second and a /8 telescope
approximately monitors 5,000 packets/second[52].
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Figure 5.1: Detecting Events on different Network Telescope sizes[59]
Table 5.1: Detection probabilities on different network telescope sizes.[59]
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Figure 5.2: Worm Infection observed by two different telescopes[59]
Figure 5.1 and table 5.1 show the detectability of different network telescopes. As it
is observed, the lines to the right offer approximately 95% probable detection. Fur-
thermore, there are significant changes in detectability proportionally to the size of a
telescope. A /8 telescope has 95% probabilty to observe an incident in 1.3 minutes,
but for a telescope of /24 it is 58 days. Additionally, from figure 5.2 can be observed
that a smaller telescope like /16 has less accuracy for determining incident times. On
the other hand, a /8 telescope has higher accurancy to determine start and end times
for the duration of an incident[59].
Furthermore, it is important to be understood that unused addresses must be globally
reachable and stable, because router problems can effect the monitoring power of a tele-
scope. In addition, resource constraints can determine the performance and availability
of the sensors. For instance, if the network that the sensors rely upon is under DoS
attack, the event could cause congestion and overloading of the network. Therefore,
the visibility is affected and the traffic observed is not properly characterized. Fur-
thermore, the statistical differences in various sensors arises from the sampling traffic
observed and the results are different in every monitor. Hence, hypothesis testing for
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homogeneity can be used to resolve these matters[20].
Moore et al., on the other hand, explained certain assumptions in order to empha-
size that while selecting an address range for network telescopes, there is a variety of
reasons that IPs must be selected randomly and uniformly. Often, in order to select
addresses there is a bias to some regions, because some are heavily used instead of
others. Therefore, there might be serious problems if the selection of IPs is not at
random. Worms, in particular, spread with the help of nearby addresses. If the prop-
agation is generated into ranges not observed by the telescope, the worm activity will
not be monitored effectively. Hence, address range must be selected at random and
uniformly. Additionally, the monitoring algorithm must be chosen carefully and under
certain considerations or else if the selected algorithm is not considered to have the
appropriate features for a certain telescope, the results observed will be for a telescope
of complete different size and topology[64].
Another assumption that must be considered is the targeting rates. A network telescope
has the tendency to underestimate the targeting reasons, because of the aggressive
events that propagate and overload the network used by the darknet. Furthermore,
there must be a consideration of the recorded events; how they sored, where and when.
Furthermore, the data collection and analysis systems might have limitations to their
capacity and processing capabilities. Therefore, in the case of an aggressive event at
its peak, the storage and processing systems might collapse. Additionally, routing
instabilities effect the results observed through a network telescope and traffic data
might be lost, resulting to deficient analysis and classification. Lastly, because of the
combination of pandemic and endemic incidents observed, the network telescope must
have the ability to accurately categorize them. One kind of solution considered to
the above problems is the distributed telescope which was analyzed to the topologies
chapter[64].
Furthermore, it was observed that scanning and probing locally is of great concern
than global activity, because internal hosts are already inside the security perimeters
of the network[38]. Therefore, the vicinity of active hosts seems to be a crucial matter
for a topological placement[52]. Hence, the topology of a network telescope always
characterizes its monitoring ability. If a network telescope is placed behind a security
device(e.g firewall or filtering machinery), then the visibility of a network telescope
is decreasing since it cannot observe efficiently external traffic. On the other hand,
telescopes can provide important monitoring activity inside a local network. Dark-
nets that are placed inside and outside a network perimeter can monitor with further
efficiency[52].
Additionally, Cuiy et al. emphasizing on the effectiveness of network telescopes, observe
that passive analysis of network telescopes have limitations because of the passive
monitoring and that do not interact with the attacker. By interacting with an attacker,
valuable information for the source of the attack will be gained[23]. Dubendorfe, added
that with passive topologies monitoring e-mail and multi-stage worms might not be
efficient[27].
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McPherson et al., on the other hand, consulted that for efficient deployments in a
network telescope topology, must be no leak of bogons. There must be no exporting
policies to Border Gateway Protocol communities, also. Furthermore, there must be
an explicit use of egress network policies. Additionally, no leak of traffic from the
network telescopes is permitted, because if a backscatter traffic leaks from a Darknet
it is possible to defeat the functionality of the sensor[53]. In addition, a system like a
network telescope must avoid collisions with pandemic and related incidents, because
relying on signatures of worms is dangerous. A new worm can create false positives
and there is danger that the worm architect knows the systems. So, the sensors can
create false positives and the architect will create pandemic phenomena that can avoid
the sensors of network telescopes. Therefore, the deployment of telescope sensors must
be under control in order the attacker not to monitor the location of sensors and in
distributed environments the sensors not to be controlled by the attackers[75].
Network telescopes while observing the incoming activity collect the information needed
for further analysis. This incoming activity can be large depending on the space that
a network monitor is observing[52]. Therefore, the collection of compressed data that
can be stored by a network telescope can sometimes surpass 30G/day. So, it needs
efficient storage system and for evaluation real-time reporting services. It also must
store packet information like headers effectively[59]. Moreover, a critical matter to
the operation of network telescopes is the services running on the hosts either emu-
lated or real daemons. This matter is very important, because of the decision taken
it depends also the reactions of network telescopes to various incidents. Therefore,
appropriate services running is complex and crucial for the visibility and interactions
of a telescope[52].
For instance, in hybrid systems like honeyfarms, information received from unique
threats are not clearly defined. Therefore, hybrid systems need intelligent systems
for decision making. Meaning that, imperfect information must be categorized and
the systems must collect the packets properly from the sensors[5]. Furthermore, the
responder used by the IMS is a lightweight and there might be high probability, that
information on application threats cannot be properly monitored[4]. On the other hand,
devices like ingress filters and reflectors, can bias the results(e.g. rate estimations) of
the attacks. Additionally, lost packets, machinery or network overload and limitations
can bias the attacks rates and durations. Also, backscatter hypothesis can bias if
unsolicited traffic send on purpose such as port scanning. Moreover, not all packets
like RST/TCP are monitored by an endemic incident[59].
On the other hand, Honeynet allows the collection of specific information on various
incidents. It obtains information, by allowing attackers to have privilege access[70].
This successful interaction is based on the use of Virtual Machine Monitors which al-
low the correct manageability of the Virtual Machines in order to be loaded or used on
demand. Furthermore, offer a platform for the efficient instrumentation and monitor-
ing of compromised systems. Therefore, the researchers/administrators can efficiently
interact with the memory, disk allocation and system calls of the infectee[89].
HoneyTank, which belongs to the category of honeyfarms, showed an increased moni-
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Figure 5.3: HoneyTank deployment traces[87]
toring activity even in experiments. Despite the firewall, HoneyTank had the ability to
collect large amount of malicious activity. Figure 5.3, describes the targeted ports in
traces from attacks. Even if through the experiments port distribution was changing,
80/TCP (HTTP) remained the top of the port preferences. Port 6129 , was mostly
attacked, is associated with the Dameware Mini Remote Control Protocol. Port 9898,
probably is the attack of Dabber worm and at port 2745 is considered to be the back-
door left by the Beagle worm[87].
On the other hand, Honeytank is easily detectable because of the emulation services and
an experienced attacker can understand the system’s features. So, there is a problem
with the emulation. Therefore, emulation services must be configured accurately and
maintain their states. However, while emulated services interact with worms can not be
understood and so can interact effectively. Furthermore, as all honeypots, HoneyTank
when is not maintaining a state is not vulnerable to endemic incidents. Therefore, a
proper installation is needed, because if it is compromised by an attacker can easily be
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the amplificator for propagation or for unsolicited traffic[87].
Furthermore, Dark Oracle has a need for host configuration resources. Meaning that,
because networks are complicated and sometimes there are hosts that do not allo-
cated to databases, gaining access to hosts in environments such as Data Centers and
configure devices for statistical data might not be efficient. Furthermore, it can be a
misclassification of addresses due to instability reasons. Moreover, there is probability
that the attacker can fingerprint the dark addresses and avoid them efficiently. On
the other hand, Dark Oracle is resistant to fingerprinting techniques, because of the
independent data sources used by the system. In addition, the researchers observed
that a pool of addresses could be used in unused ports of TCP and UDP. Furthermore,
it is observed that by sharing IPs to organizations and customers can be beneficial for
the monitoring activity[19].
Additionally, Vrable et al. referred that with the use of honeypots in the Potemkin
honeyfarm there is a possibility the attracted attacks from P2P, Internet messengers
and e-mails to need further mechanisms for efficient monitoring. For instance, in the
case of e-mails the system must be configured properly and examine the message for
viruses or malwares. Furthermore, the attacker may attempt to detect the topology
and the environment and modify the attack behavior. Therefore, a virtualized environ-
ment can offer camouflaging techniques and protect the system. On the other hand, a
virtual machine cannot offer a full camouflage and further extensions. Therefore, the
system must be available depending on the needs of the organization or the institution.
However, an attacker with extended knowledge of the honeyfarm topology can violate
the system. Consequently, a detection and Virtual Machine policy is needed in case
the system is compromised. If compromised, the policies must define the lifetime of
Virtual Machines and how the system must interact on those occasions[89].
5.3 Summary
On this chapter, there was an analysis on the effectiveness of network telescopes. It was
analyzed the deficiencies observed through research and how these deficiencies can be
solved. Furthermore, from the evaluation of network telescopes, it can be understood
that proper scientific implementation is needed for effective network telescopes.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Network telescopes observe through the help of unused addresses and characterize the
traffic flow of a network by monitoring techniques. Special algorithmic models are used
in order a darknet to categorize the activity of various incidents and misconfiguration
packets. Through this report, the effectiveness of network telescopes was analyzed to
observe pandemic and endemic incidents, meaning DoS and worm attacks, which are
the most crucial phenomena for the liveliness of a network and its resources.
As it was examined, researchers categorized telescopes basis to their ability to monitor
incidents on various networks. Therefore, a /8 network telescope has the ability to
collect vast amount of information and thus has extended visibility. Therefore, as it is
understood, a network telescope depends on the address ranges that monitors. Hence,
a smaller telescope will process less data for classification than a /8 network. Moreover,
basis to the range of addresses observed that a telescope has a certain possibility to
detect phenomena that might overload resources or the network.
Furthermore, network telescopes make use of complex mathematical tools in order
to categorize an incident. For unsolicited traffic of an endemic incident, backscatter
analysis is used in order to monitor and extract packets, having the ability to categorize
the packets also. On the other hand, researchers use the SI or the AAWP models for
propagation modeling of pandemic incidents such as CodeRed worm and Blaster.
Moreover, researchers extended the models of network telescopes and implement vari-
ous architectures. Through the various architectures, the ability of a network telescope
was examined to observe packets passively or actively. For passive monitors such as dis-
tributed, anycast and transit network telescopes , it was observed that telescopes have
certain features on how to categorize the activity without interactions. On the other
hand, the honeyfarms were also introduced which have the ability to interact with the
attackers and conclude to proper results, about the categorization and characterization
of the attacker and of the incident.
Also, for the hybrid systems, it was mentioned on previous chapters that several re-
search problems must be solved for successful operation. Filtering interactions, for
instance, observe a vast amount of traffic which must be redirected to the honeyfarm.
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In order to redirect data to the honeyfarm, data must be reduced. For the emulated
hosts, the problem is that hosts can be fingerprinted. So, there must be a highly so-
phisticated and complex system in order to avoid fingerprinting results. Furthermore,
the need of forensic techniques might be crucial, because generated actions must be
categorized properly. There must be a categorization of signatures and behaviors that
characterize the traffic in a network, also. Additionally, managing virtual machines
with efficiency is difficult. VMs need efficient management, because it is expected to
interact with several requests[5].
From the research conducted so far it was observed that network telescopes have several
advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are that network telescope can be easily
deployed, with proper algorithm can be used to all infrastructures and deliver a certain
quality of security. A quality of security can be delivered especially for pandemic and
endemic incidents, because these types of attacks generate vast amounts of information
and can only be categorized through the information received and by proper use of
specific algorithms. But network telescopes, on the other hand, have many deficiencies
to certain areas. In particular, the algorithms can be too complex for an organization,
business, enterprise or institution to work on these models, except if they have already
researchers on this field. The implementations can be costly, if for instance an enterprise
needs a honeyfarm.
Furthermore, network telescopes depending on their range of monitoring can conclude
safe results. For instance, with a /8 telescope, you can have extended visibility, instead
of a /24 telescope. Additionally, special sensors are needed or lightweight responders
to interact with the attackers. Also, specialized softwares such as Virtual Machines or
custom applications for the implementation of a proper telescope are needed. These
machinery can result to enormous amount of money and for efficient economics the
idea of a telescope cannot be properly implemented. Moreover, as it was observed,
telescopes are mostly used among academia and for research purposes to detect various
phenomena. As it was mentioned before, CAIDA for instance, was the pioneer for the
detection and proper analysis of CodeRed propagation phenomenon.
From one point of view, the implementations and the algorithms must be used for
efficiency and for proper characterization and categorization of the traffic. Furthermore,
specialized equipment must be used for extended results. From another point of view,
network telescopes can be simplified for extended use on ISPs and for organizations or
enterprises that have an extended network and already compensate a certain amount of
money for proper infrastructure. So, network telescopes need further research in order
to be simplified but not loose efficiency and usage. Additionally, small telescopes have
visibility problems which must be solved, for efficient implementations. For instance,
if a company needs to implement a small network telescope as additional security their
network must have a lot of spare resources in order to characterize a darknet of /8
network. Consequently, a small telescope observing the traffic to main servers can be
extremely useful and must generate results and conclusions at the same rate as a large
telescope of /8 network.
Furthermore, it was observed that topologies from passive to active are becoming com-
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plex and many parameters for proper implementation must be considered. Parameters
like Virtual Servers, virtual hosts, services, interactivity, sensor’s implementation and
sufficient information needed, complex systems in order honeyfarms not be compro-
mised and architectural complexity such as, “where the sensor could be placed”. On
the other hand, there is not an extended research to avoid complex matters and al-
ways the researchers mention that even a machine hosting a virtual machine can be
compromised or an attacker can fingerprint the topology and the sensors. Hence, there
must be an extended research for honeyfarms and virtual machines in order to avoid
efficiently fingerprinting techniques.
Moreover, as it can be observed in topologies, there was not an extended research for
certain implementations such as transit and anycast telescopes. Furthermore, there is
only one distributed system which monitors the activity on the Internet. This defi-
ciency, it could also be researched in order the academic community to have different
results from same topologies. For instance, the academic community can observe the
propagation model of a pandemic incident with greater visibility, if there are two dis-
tribute systems correctly implemented, one in Asia and one in CAIDA organization.
With this implementation researchers might have the possibility to observe incidents,
in particular incidents such as CodeRed, the beginning of the propagation without
delays and approximations in durations and start/end precision times.
Furthermore, it was observed that researchers experiment through emulations, mean-
ing that they implement a network telescope and emulate its model for pandemic and
endemic incidents. Of course, in some occasions the telescope is already implemented
and detects with efficiency all the incidents. From another point of view, researchers
must experiment with real case scenarios in order to have safe results. Particularly,
nematodes(beneficial worms) can be used in order a network telescope to monitor and
analyze information from real occasions. Furthermore with nematodes, which are not
referred to this project, a scientist or an administrator can observe the deficiencies
in their network and examine the visibility of a telescope. Hence, this model can be
used to small network telescopes. If nematodes are implemented in small networks
using small telescopes, the supervisor of this implementation can monitor, for instance
a month’s data, traffic, various information and store them, and intelligent imple-
mentations compare the data of one month with the data observed real time. This
implementation could help small telescopes to monitor and analyze data, and conclude
to safe results faster than before. Of course, this implementation can help also all types
of telescopes.
Nematodes, beneficial worms, have the ability to scan and analyze the vulnerabili-
ties found on a network. Therefore, if a network telescope observes the activity of
a nematode and store the data, the darknet can compare the results with real time
occasions. In particular, if a network telescope can monitor the activity of beneficial
worms, store the data observed through the propagation strategies, analyze it and
result to conclusions, there might be a possibility a network telescope to increase its
visibility and effectiveness. Furthermore, network telescopes might increase effective-
ness because of the monitoring results, meaning the activity observed can be used for
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comparing this information with the primary results of incidents in a network. For
instance, if the network telescope observe a small spike through the activity, the ad-
ministrator with the help of intelligent systems can compare the activity observed and
the activity monitored in one minute. Therefore, there must be a possibility that this
spike is an incident. So, the administrator, in order to have safe results from this
activity, can activate defensive mechanisms and isolate crucial parts of the network,
to avoid catastrophic events. Moreover, nematodes can be used in conjunction with
network telescopes and researchers can observe the ability of nematodes to cast away
pandemic incidents. Furthermore, nematodes and telescopes can be used in a different
way. When a telescope monitors an incident, it can send an alarm to the administra-
tor for information, and the telescope through intelligent systems compare the results.
Consequently, the network telescope after comparison will decide whether nematodes
can be released or not.
In conclusion, nematode (beneficial worm) is a controllable worm which can be used
for network protection. Furthermore, it can search the network for deficiencies and
offer efficiency to the infrastructure. Lastly, nematodes named by primitive worm-like
organisms, that often used to cast aside other epidemics[1].
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Appendix A
Abbreviations and Glossary
NOTE FOR THE READER
For the effective usage from the part of the reader, Abbreviations and Glossary are
combined. After the abbreviation like IP, the user will find the full explanation of the
word like INTERNET PROTOCOL and after that, the description of the word
A
AAWP, Analytical Worm Propagation model: has the ability to model propa-
gation of active worms of random scanning[16]
Active Telescope/Monitoring: An active telescope responds to incoming packets
and tries to establish communication with the attacker[34]
Anycast Telescope: use multiple locations for the proper advertisement of routes at
the same /x network. A telescope of this category does not monitor large ranges such
as a distributed monitor, but share some of the advantages and disadvantages[64]
Address (Netwrok or IPv4 address): IPv4 addresses are logical addresses con-
sisted of 32 bits long and have 256 possible combinations, but 0 represents the local
address and 255 the broadcasts[85]
ACK, Acknowledgment flag: a control character indicating that a packet has been
received without an error. In certain net- work architectures, ACK is used for a frame
that sends such an acknowledgment[29]
B
90
Backscatter: is the excess of DoS attack. This excess derives from SYN flood which
is a stream of TCP/SYN packets sent to the target. When attacker sends TCP/SYN
packets from spoofed sources, the SYN packet received from the victim is for synchro-
nization on a new connection. If the source was not found, the target will try allocation
of new structures for the connection. So, if the target replies with SYN/ACK becomes
backscatter[34]
BGP, Border Gateway Protocol: In the Internet TCP/IP protocol suite, a pro-
tocol for routing packets between networks that use different protocols. This type of
protocol is known as an exterior gateway protocol (EGP)[29]
C
CIDR, Classless Interdomain Routing: a routing strategy that was developed as
a partial solution to two difficulties that have developed as the number of networks
connected to the Internet has grown very large.[29]
D
(D)DoS, (Distributed)Denial-of-Service: the attacker spoofs IP addresses ran-
domly and floods the targets with requests. The target responds believing that the
sender is a legitimate user[59]. Distributed attacks rely on this technique, but also
consumes network resources and relies on large hosts assistant[4]
Distributed Telescope: A distributed network telescope is the combination of tele-
scopes for the purpose of monitoring different ranges of addresses into a large one. Can
take the form of contiguous ranges such as a heterogeneous distributed system or an
area of P2P networks[64]
DHCP, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol: On a TCP/IP-based network,
DHCP is used to get information about a client host’s (i.e., a network node’s) config-
uration from a DHCP server, which is a specially designated network node[29]
DNS, Domain Naming System: DNS is the distributed naming service used on
the Internet. The DNS can provide a machine’s IP address, given domain names for
the machine[29]
E
Endemic Incidents (see (D)DoS)
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Egress Monitor: egress monitor is used for monitoring outgoing traffic in order to
infer potential behavior from worms[95]
F
FTP, File Transfer Protocol: In the TCP/IP (or Internet) protocol suite, a file
transfer protocol. FTP is an application layer protocol that uses the services of the
TCP protocol at the transport layer to move the files[29]
Flood: In a network, the uncontrolled propagation of discovery or other packets[29]
Firewall: A firewall is a network component that provides a security barrier between
networks or network segments. Firewalls are generally set up to protect a particular
network or network component from attack, or unauthorized penetration, by outside
invaders[29]
G
Gateway: In the context of local-area networks (LANs) and mainframe connections,
a gateway is a hardware and/or software package that connects two different network
environments[29]
H
Honeyfarm, Honeynet or Hybrid system: collection of honeypots monitored by
a network telescope[69]
HTTP, Hypertext Transfer Protocol: HTTP is the primary protocol for request-
ing and providing documents on the Internet’s World Wide Web (WWW)[29]
HMS, Host Motion Sensor: The IMS will be monitoring the range of addresses
and the activity will be proxied to the HMS for in depth analysis of the incidents.
Furthermore, in oder to avoid false positives and scaling issues combination with a
pre-filtering installation could be examined[5]
I
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IMS, Internet Monitor Sensor: The Internet Motion Sensor has the ability to
detect from distributed networks of /24 nets around the global network[38]. Con-
sists of 60 network telescopes from 18 organizations, enterprises and networks from
academia in 3 continents world wide. Furthermore, observes approximately over 17
million addresses[52]
IP, Internet Protocol: is an address for a station or other device on the Internet.
This type of address consists of 4 bytes, which are represented as decimal values sep-
arated by periods, as in 123.45.67.89. In order to ensure uniqueness, IP addresses are
assigned in part by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)[29]
ICMP, Internet Control Message Protocol: In the TCP/IP protocol suite, a
protocol used to handle errors at the network layer. ICMP is actually part of the IP,
which is the network layer protocol in the TCP/IP suite[29]
IRC, Internet Relay Chat: A service that extends Talk capabilities to allow multi
party conversations[29]
Ingress Monitor: The ingress monitors can be placed on routers locally or on passive
topologies for logging traffic[95]
J
K
L
M
N
Network Telescope(Darknet/BlackHole/Internet Sink/Telescope): A Net-
work Telescope considered to be a portion of routed IP addresses, with no or little
legitimate traffic exists[64]
O
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Pandemic (see also Worm)
Passive Telescope/Monitoring: Through passive monitoring, a telescope can ob-
serve the packets and keep logs and discard them, but without interacting with the
attacker[34, 77]
Port Address or Name: A port address is a bus or memory address associated with
a particular hardware port. There will generally be at least enough storage allocated
at the port address to handle data being written or read at the port. A port name can
be used instead of an address to refer to a port. The port name is presumably easier
to remember than an address[29]
Payload: In ATM network terminology, the payload is the data portion of an ATM
cell, or packet. This cell consists of a ?ve-octet header and a 48-octet payload. More
generally, payload refers to the data portion of a packet (for example, of an IP packet,
or datagram)[29]
(IP) Packet Header Fields: An IP packet consists of a header and data, known as a
payload. The payload can be up to 64 kilobytes (KB) and must be at least 512 bytes[29]
Q
R
Router: A router gets a packet from a node or from another router and passes this
packet on to a destination specified in an embedded (network layer) packet, which is
known as an NPDU (network-layer protocol data unit)[29]
RPC, Remote Procedure Call: which makes it possible to call an application
or function on any machine, just as if the resource were local or even part of the
application[29]
S
SI, Epidemic Model: illustrates the growth of infectious pathogen propagating
through similar random contacts between Susceptible and Infected hosts[65]
SYN, Synchronization: In bisynchronous, or bisync, communication, a special
(SYN) character is used to establish synchronization for an entire data block. Both
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sender and receiver must be sychronized. The receiver must acknowledge the receipt
of each block with alternating ACK characters[29]
SNMP, Simple Network Management Protocol: used to control network- man-
agement services and to transfer management-related data[29]
SMTP, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol: In the TCP/IP protocol suite, an appli-
cation layer protocol that provides a simple electronic-mail service. SMTP uses the
services of the TCP protocol at the transport layer to send and receive messages[29]
Susceptible: vulnerable host, but not yet exploited[65]
Stateful responder: will keep each connection’s state if it is active[34]
Stateless responder: will design an application response based on previous packets.
Furthermore, filtering might be needed for effective monitoring of the traffic[34]
T
Transit Network Telescope: monitors IP ranges, but from within the transit net-
work and not from the edges of /x network. It can observe large ranges of addresses
and can manage to monitor centrally and do not have synchronization and distribution
problems[64]
TCP, Transmission Control Protocol: provides connection- and stream-oriented,
transport-layer services. TCP uses the IP to deliver its packets[29]
TTL, Time To Live: Originally, this field indicated the number of seconds the packet
was allowed to travel in a network before being destroyed[29]
U
UDP, User Datagram Protocol: provides connectionless transport-layer service.
UDP also uses the IP to deliver its packet[29]
V
VM, Virtual Machine
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WWorm, Internet Worm: is a self-replicating/propagating program which exploits
vulnerabilities without human intervention in order to infect hosts[56]
X
Y
Z
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